Firm B Q=5 Q=6 Q = 5 16,16 12,18 Q = 6 Firm A 18,12 13,13 The Nash equilibrium in this game is Q = 5 for firm A and Q = 5 for firm B. Q = 6 for firm A and Q = 6 for firm B. Q = 5 for firm A and Q = 6 for firm B. Q = 6 for firm A and Q = 5 for firm B.

Firm B Q=5 Q=6 Q = 5 16,16 12,18 Q = 6 Firm A 18,12 13,13 The Nash equilibrium in this game is Q = 5 for firm A and Q = 5 for firm B. Q = 6 for firm A and Q = 6 for firm B. Q = 5 for firm A and Q = 6 for firm B. Q = 6 for firm A and Q = 5 for firm B.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

Firm B
Q = 5 Q=6
Firm A
Q= 5
16,16 12,18
Q = 6
18,12 13,13
The Nash equilibrium in this game is
Q = 5 for firm A and Q = 5 for firm B.
Q = 6 for firm A and Q = 6 for firm B.
%3D
Q = 5 for firm A and Q = 6 for firm B.
Q = 6 for firm A and Q = 5 for firm B.
%3D

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