Felix, Larry, and Raphael are trappers who live next to a recreational hunting area that is open to trapping; in other words, anyone is free to use the recreational hunting area for trapping. Assume that these men are the only three trappers who trap in this recreational hunting area and that the recreational hunting area is large enough for all three trappers to trap intensively at the same time. Each year, the trappers choose independently how often to trap; specifically, they choose whether to trap intensively (that is, to set several traps and hunt long hours, which hurts the sustainability of the recreational hunting area if enough people do it) or to trap nonintensively (which does not hurt the sustainability of the recreational hunting area). None of them has the ability to control how much the others trap, and each trapper cares only about his own profitability and not about the state of the recreational hunting area. Assume that as long as no more than one trapper traps intensively, there are enough animals to restock the recreational hunting area. However, if two or more trap intensively, the recreational hunting area will become useless in the future. Of course, trapping intensively earns a trapper more money and greater profit because he can sell more animals. The recreational hunting area is an example of because the animals in the recreational hunting area are and . Depending on whether Larry and Raphael both choose to trap either nonintensively or intensively, fill in Felix's profit-maximizing response in the following table, given Larry and Raphael's actions. Larry and Raphael's Actions Trap Nonintensively Trap Intensively Felix's Profit-Maximizing Response Which of the following solutions could ensure that the recreational hunting area is sustainable in the long run, assuming that the regulation is enforceable? Check all that apply. Outlaw intensive trapping. Convert the recreational hunting area to private property, and allow the owner to sell trapping rights. Develop a program that entices more trappers to move to the area.
Felix, Larry, and Raphael are trappers who live next to a recreational hunting area that is open to trapping; in other words, anyone is free to use the recreational hunting area for trapping. Assume that these men are the only three trappers who trap in this recreational hunting area and that the recreational hunting area is large enough for all three trappers to trap intensively at the same time. Each year, the trappers choose independently how often to trap; specifically, they choose whether to trap intensively (that is, to set several traps and hunt long hours, which hurts the sustainability of the recreational hunting area if enough people do it) or to trap nonintensively (which does not hurt the sustainability of the recreational hunting area). None of them has the ability to control how much the others trap, and each trapper cares only about his own profitability and not about the state of the recreational hunting area. Assume that as long as no more than one trapper traps intensively, there are enough animals to restock the recreational hunting area. However, if two or more trap intensively, the recreational hunting area will become useless in the future. Of course, trapping intensively earns a trapper more money and greater profit because he can sell more animals. The recreational hunting area is an example of because the animals in the recreational hunting area are and . Depending on whether Larry and Raphael both choose to trap either nonintensively or intensively, fill in Felix's profit-maximizing response in the following table, given Larry and Raphael's actions. Larry and Raphael's Actions Trap Nonintensively Trap Intensively Felix's Profit-Maximizing Response Which of the following solutions could ensure that the recreational hunting area is sustainable in the long run, assuming that the regulation is enforceable? Check all that apply. Outlaw intensive trapping. Convert the recreational hunting area to private property, and allow the owner to sell trapping rights. Develop a program that entices more trappers to move to the area.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
5. Common resources and the tragedy of the commons
Felix, Larry, and Raphael are trappers who live next to a recreational hunting area that is open to trapping; in other words, anyone is free to use the recreational hunting area for trapping. Assume that these men are the only three trappers who trap in this recreational hunting area and that the recreational hunting area is large enough for all three trappers to trap intensively at the same time.
Each year, the trappers choose independently how often to trap; specifically, they choose whether to trap intensively (that is, to set several traps and hunt long hours, which hurts the sustainability of the recreational hunting area if enough people do it) or to trap nonintensively (which does not hurt the sustainability of the recreational hunting area). None of them has the ability to control how much the others trap, and each trapper cares only about his own profitability and not about the state of the recreational hunting area.
Assume that as long as no more than one trapper traps intensively, there are enough animals to restock the recreational hunting area. However, if two or more trap intensively, the recreational hunting area will become useless in the future. Of course, trapping intensively earns a trapper more money and greater profit because he can sell more animals.
The recreational hunting area is an example of because the animals in the recreational hunting area are and .
Depending on whether Larry and Raphael both choose to trap either nonintensively or intensively, fill in Felix's profit-maximizing response in the following table, given Larry and Raphael's actions.
|
Larry and Raphael's Actions
|
|
---|---|---|
Trap Nonintensively
|
Trap Intensively
|
|
Felix's Profit-Maximizing Response |
Which of the following solutions could ensure that the recreational hunting area is sustainable in the long run, assuming that the regulation is enforceable? Check all that apply.
Outlaw intensive trapping.
Convert the recreational hunting area to private property, and allow the owner to sell trapping rights.
Develop a program that entices more trappers to move to the area.
|
Expert Solution
This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
This is a popular solution!
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 2 steps
Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education