EXERCISE 73.1 (Electoral competition between candidates who care only about the winning position) Consider the variant of Hotelling's model in which the can- didates (like the citizens) care about the winner's position, and not at all about winning per se. There are two candidates. Each candidate has a favorite position; her dislike for other positions increases with their distance from her favorite po- sition. Assume that the favorite position of one candidate is less than m and the favorite position of the other candidate is greater than m. Assume also that if the candidates tie when they take the positions x₁ and x2 then the outcome is the com- promise policy (x₁+x2). Find the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models this situation. (First consider pairs (x₁, x2) of positions for which ei- ther x₁ < m and x₂ < m, or x₁ > m and x₂ > m. Next consider pairs (x₁, x2) for which either x₁ < m < x2, or x₂ < m < x₁, then those for which x₁ = m and x2 m, or x₁ m and x2 = m. Finally consider the pair (m, m).)
EXERCISE 73.1 (Electoral competition between candidates who care only about the winning position) Consider the variant of Hotelling's model in which the can- didates (like the citizens) care about the winner's position, and not at all about winning per se. There are two candidates. Each candidate has a favorite position; her dislike for other positions increases with their distance from her favorite po- sition. Assume that the favorite position of one candidate is less than m and the favorite position of the other candidate is greater than m. Assume also that if the candidates tie when they take the positions x₁ and x2 then the outcome is the com- promise policy (x₁+x2). Find the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models this situation. (First consider pairs (x₁, x2) of positions for which ei- ther x₁ < m and x₂ < m, or x₁ > m and x₂ > m. Next consider pairs (x₁, x2) for which either x₁ < m < x2, or x₂ < m < x₁, then those for which x₁ = m and x2 m, or x₁ m and x2 = m. Finally consider the pair (m, m).)
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
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![EXERCISE 73.1 (Electoral competition between candidates who care only about the
winning position) Consider the variant of Hotelling's model in which the can-
didates (like the citizens) care about the winner's position, and not at all about
winning per se. There are two candidates. Each candidate has a favorite position;
her dislike for other positions increases with their distance from her favorite po-
sition. Assume that the favorite position of one candidate is less than m and the
favorite position of the other candidate is greater than m. Assume also that if the
candidates tie when they take the positions x₁ and x₂ then the outcome is the com-
promise policy (x₁+x₂). Find the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic game
that models this situation. (First consider pairs (x₁, x2) of positions for which ei-
ther x₁ < m and x2 < m, or x₁ > m and x₂ > m. Next consider pairs (x₁, x2) for
which either x₁ <m < x₂, or x₂ < m < x₁, then those for which x₁ = m and
x₂ ‡ m, or x₁ ‡ m and x2 = m. Finally consider the pair (m, m).)](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fac709e92-d5bf-4722-a44f-338534d5d3fb%2Ffb97dbdc-9ac1-4b01-8e61-e0b6ca7efdb9%2Fd5qe6t8_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:EXERCISE 73.1 (Electoral competition between candidates who care only about the
winning position) Consider the variant of Hotelling's model in which the can-
didates (like the citizens) care about the winner's position, and not at all about
winning per se. There are two candidates. Each candidate has a favorite position;
her dislike for other positions increases with their distance from her favorite po-
sition. Assume that the favorite position of one candidate is less than m and the
favorite position of the other candidate is greater than m. Assume also that if the
candidates tie when they take the positions x₁ and x₂ then the outcome is the com-
promise policy (x₁+x₂). Find the set of Nash equilibria of the strategic game
that models this situation. (First consider pairs (x₁, x2) of positions for which ei-
ther x₁ < m and x2 < m, or x₁ > m and x₂ > m. Next consider pairs (x₁, x2) for
which either x₁ <m < x₂, or x₂ < m < x₁, then those for which x₁ = m and
x₂ ‡ m, or x₁ ‡ m and x2 = m. Finally consider the pair (m, m).)
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