EXERCISE 183.3 (Dictator game and impunity game) The "dictator game" differs from the ultimatum game only in that person 2 does not have the option to reject person 1's offer (and thus has no strategic role in the game). The "impunity game" differs from the ultimatum game only in that person 1's payoff when person 2 rejects any offer x is c-x, rather than 0. (The game is named for the fact that person 2 is unable to "punish" person 1 for making a low offer.) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of each game.
EXERCISE 183.3 (Dictator game and impunity game) The "dictator game" differs from the ultimatum game only in that person 2 does not have the option to reject person 1's offer (and thus has no strategic role in the game). The "impunity game" differs from the ultimatum game only in that person 1's payoff when person 2 rejects any offer x is c-x, rather than 0. (The game is named for the fact that person 2 is unable to "punish" person 1 for making a low offer.) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of each game.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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![EXERCISE 183.3 (Dictator game and impunity game) The "dictator game" differs
from the ultimatum game only in that person 2 does not have the option to reject
person 1's offer (and thus has no strategic role in the game). The "impunity game"
differs from the ultimatum game only in that person 1's payoff when person 2
rejects any offer x is c-x, rather than 0. (The game is named for the fact that
person 2 is unable to "punish" person 1 for making a low offer.) Find the subgame
perfect equilibria of each game.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fa7d1c47f-ebeb-4433-a23d-a68418d8e04e%2F157b3465-45cc-4051-a3a0-b9168f5209a5%2F9rnkff_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:EXERCISE 183.3 (Dictator game and impunity game) The "dictator game" differs
from the ultimatum game only in that person 2 does not have the option to reject
person 1's offer (and thus has no strategic role in the game). The "impunity game"
differs from the ultimatum game only in that person 1's payoff when person 2
rejects any offer x is c-x, rather than 0. (The game is named for the fact that
person 2 is unable to "punish" person 1 for making a low offer.) Find the subgame
perfect equilibria of each game.
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