Exercise 1** In the text, it is assumed that the supplier's investment reduces his production cost. Assume instead that the ex ante investment affects the quality of the product and thus the value to the buyer. The buyer's ex post value is v(I) = 31 –I². Hence, the buyer's surplus in case of trade is v(I) – p. The supplier's surplus is then p – c – I (where c < ; is now a constant production cost). Suppose that I (and, hence, v ) is observable by the buyer; however, it is not verifiable by a court, so that it cannot be specified by a contract. (i) Determine the efficient amount of investment. (ii) Suppose that there is no contract and the two parties bargain expost according to the Nash bargaining solution. Is the investment optimal? Point out the externality. (iii) Suppose that the parties sign a contract specifying that the buyer has the right to buy the good at a given price p. Is this contract efficient? What if the supplier has the right to sell at a given price? -

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
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Exercise 1** In the text, it is assumed that the supplier's investment
reduces his production cost. Assume instead that the ex ante investment
affects the quality of the product and thus the value to the buyer. The
buyer's ex post value is v(I) = 31 –I². Hence, the buyer's surplus in
case of trade is v(I) – p. The supplier's surplus is then p – c – I (where
c < ; is now a constant production cost). Suppose that I (and, hence, v )
is observable by the buyer; however, it is not verifiable by a court, so that
it cannot be specified by a contract.
(i) Determine the efficient amount of investment.
(ii) Suppose that there is no contract and the two parties bargain expost
according to the Nash bargaining solution. Is the investment optimal?
Point out the externality.
(iii) Suppose that the parties sign a contract specifying that the buyer has
the right to buy the good at a given price p. Is this contract efficient?
What if the supplier has the right to sell at a given price?
-
Transcribed Image Text:Exercise 1** In the text, it is assumed that the supplier's investment reduces his production cost. Assume instead that the ex ante investment affects the quality of the product and thus the value to the buyer. The buyer's ex post value is v(I) = 31 –I². Hence, the buyer's surplus in case of trade is v(I) – p. The supplier's surplus is then p – c – I (where c < ; is now a constant production cost). Suppose that I (and, hence, v ) is observable by the buyer; however, it is not verifiable by a court, so that it cannot be specified by a contract. (i) Determine the efficient amount of investment. (ii) Suppose that there is no contract and the two parties bargain expost according to the Nash bargaining solution. Is the investment optimal? Point out the externality. (iii) Suppose that the parties sign a contract specifying that the buyer has the right to buy the good at a given price p. Is this contract efficient? What if the supplier has the right to sell at a given price? -
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