Elsa and Anna are two students each considering whether to pursue a college education before entering the job market. For each worker, an education level of E= 1 indicates that she has completed college and earned a degree, while E = 0 indicates she has not. Elsa can generate VE = 36 worth of output per hour while Anna can only produce Vª = 12 per hour. Obtaining a degree is costly, and the students must pay for their educations by taking out student loans that will be repaid during their working years. Elsa is a naturally capable student so the degree costs her the equivalent of CE = 18 per hour in future wages, whereas Anna struggles with her studies and must pay CA = 27 per hour. Note that their education levels do not impact their productivity. Hans is an employer who cannot observe the workers' innate abilities, but can observe their education levels. The labor market is competitive, so that Hans must always offer a wage equal to his reservation price, and thus makes zero profit. (a) Suppose that Hans offers the same wage W to all workers, regardless of whether they attended college or not. What education levels do Elsa and Anna choose? What wage does Hans offer?
Elsa and Anna are two students each considering whether to pursue a college education before entering the job market. For each worker, an education level of E= 1 indicates that she has completed college and earned a degree, while E = 0 indicates she has not. Elsa can generate VE = 36 worth of output per hour while Anna can only produce Vª = 12 per hour. Obtaining a degree is costly, and the students must pay for their educations by taking out student loans that will be repaid during their working years. Elsa is a naturally capable student so the degree costs her the equivalent of CE = 18 per hour in future wages, whereas Anna struggles with her studies and must pay CA = 27 per hour. Note that their education levels do not impact their productivity. Hans is an employer who cannot observe the workers' innate abilities, but can observe their education levels. The labor market is competitive, so that Hans must always offer a wage equal to his reservation price, and thus makes zero profit. (a) Suppose that Hans offers the same wage W to all workers, regardless of whether they attended college or not. What education levels do Elsa and Anna choose? What wage does Hans offer?
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
![Elsa and Anna are two students each considering whether to pursue a college education
before entering the job market. For each worker, an education level of E = 1 indicates that
she has completed college and earned a degree, while E = 0 indicates she has not. Elsa can
generate VE = 36 worth of output per hour while Anna can only produce V4 = 12 per hour.
3.
Obtaining a degree is costly, and the students must pay for their educations by taking out
student loans that will be repaid during their working years. Elsa is a naturally capable
student so the degree costs her the equivalent of CE = 18 per hour in future wages, whereas
Anna struggles with her studies and must pay C4 = 27 per hour. Note that their education
%3!
levels do not impact their productivity.
Hans is an employer who cannot observe the workers' innate abilities, but can observe their
education levels. The labor market is competitive, so that Hans must always offer a wage
equal to his reservation price, and thus makes zero profit.
(a)
Suppose that Hans offers the same wage W to all workers, regardless of whether
they attended college or not. What education levels do Elsa and Anna choose? What
wage does Hans offer?
|Now suppose that Hans decides to offer higher wages to workers with college degrees
(b)
Wi than to those without Wo. What education levels must he expect Elsa and Anna to
choose in order to justify this? What wages does Hans offer?
(c)
Show that both Elsa and Anna have an incentive to choose the education levels that
match Hans' expectations.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F72d909c7-fc09-452c-a2ab-a4e3968f4954%2F31c84f0e-c49d-415c-a70b-f7d05b70ac7b%2F5a1x1i4_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Elsa and Anna are two students each considering whether to pursue a college education
before entering the job market. For each worker, an education level of E = 1 indicates that
she has completed college and earned a degree, while E = 0 indicates she has not. Elsa can
generate VE = 36 worth of output per hour while Anna can only produce V4 = 12 per hour.
3.
Obtaining a degree is costly, and the students must pay for their educations by taking out
student loans that will be repaid during their working years. Elsa is a naturally capable
student so the degree costs her the equivalent of CE = 18 per hour in future wages, whereas
Anna struggles with her studies and must pay C4 = 27 per hour. Note that their education
%3!
levels do not impact their productivity.
Hans is an employer who cannot observe the workers' innate abilities, but can observe their
education levels. The labor market is competitive, so that Hans must always offer a wage
equal to his reservation price, and thus makes zero profit.
(a)
Suppose that Hans offers the same wage W to all workers, regardless of whether
they attended college or not. What education levels do Elsa and Anna choose? What
wage does Hans offer?
|Now suppose that Hans decides to offer higher wages to workers with college degrees
(b)
Wi than to those without Wo. What education levels must he expect Elsa and Anna to
choose in order to justify this? What wages does Hans offer?
(c)
Show that both Elsa and Anna have an incentive to choose the education levels that
match Hans' expectations.
Expert Solution
![](/static/compass_v2/shared-icons/check-mark.png)
This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
Step by step
Solved in 5 steps with 3 images
![Blurred answer](/static/compass_v2/solution-images/blurred-answer.jpg)
Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you
![ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS](https://compass-isbn-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/isbn_cover_images/9780190931919/9780190931919_smallCoverImage.gif)
![Principles of Economics (12th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134078779/9780134078779_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Engineering Economy (17th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134870069/9780134870069_smallCoverImage.gif)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
![ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS](https://compass-isbn-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/isbn_cover_images/9780190931919/9780190931919_smallCoverImage.gif)
![Principles of Economics (12th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134078779/9780134078779_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Engineering Economy (17th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134870069/9780134870069_smallCoverImage.gif)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781305585126/9781305585126_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
![Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781337106665/9781337106665_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
![Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781259290619/9781259290619_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education