A competitive lender makes loans to a pool of borrowers that are identical. After borrowers have received their loans they choose one of two investment projects. with probability Pg. With probability 1 – Pg, Project G pays a rate of return of -1, the borrower defaults on the loan, and the lender receives Project G pays the borrower a rate of return of r. nothing. Project B pays the borrower a rate of return of rB with probability pp. And with probability 1 – Pb, Project B pays a rate of return of -1, the borrower defaults on the loan, and the lender receives nothing. < rb, Pg > Pb, and P,(1+ rg) > Po(1+ rb). Suppose rg 0.98, pr = 0.4, rp = 0.02, L = 1. We assume as usual that rg 0.10, rb 0.12, Pg %3D The lender can't distinguish between borrower types and so it charges all borrowers the same interest rate rL. The lender lends an amount L and pays interest rp on funds acquired from depositors. Round your answer to at least three decimal places. Suppose that rL 0.15. Compute the collateral to loan ratio c, that ensures that the borrower is indifferent between the projects G and B. Round your answer to at least three decimal places.

A competitive lender makes loans to a pool of borrowers that are identical. After borrowers have received their loans they choose one of two investment projects. with probability Pg. With probability 1 – Pg, Project G pays a rate of return of -1, the borrower defaults on the loan, and the lender receives Project G pays the borrower a rate of return of r. nothing. Project B pays the borrower a rate of return of rB with probability pp. And with probability 1 – Pb, Project B pays a rate of return of -1, the borrower defaults on the loan, and the lender receives nothing. < rb, Pg > Pb, and P,(1+ rg) > Po(1+ rb). Suppose rg 0.98, pr = 0.4, rp = 0.02, L = 1. We assume as usual that rg 0.10, rb 0.12, Pg %3D The lender can't distinguish between borrower types and so it charges all borrowers the same interest rate rL. The lender lends an amount L and pays interest rp on funds acquired from depositors. Round your answer to at least three decimal places. Suppose that rL 0.15. Compute the collateral to loan ratio c, that ensures that the borrower is indifferent between the projects G and B. Round your answer to at least three decimal places.

Essentials Of Investments

11th Edition

ISBN:9781260013924

Author:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.

Publisher:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.

Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PS

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A project's internal rate of return (IRR) is the discount rate YTM on a bond. The equation for calculating the IRR is: timing Project A Project B 0 1 2 CFt is the expected cash flow in Period t and cash outflows are treated as negative cash flows. There must be a change in cash flow signs to calculate the IRR. The IRR equation is simply the NPV equation solved for the particular discount rate that causes NPV to equal zero 320 255 The IRR calculation assumes that cash flows are reinvested at the IRR If the IRR is greater ✔than the project's risk-adjusted cost of capital, then the project should be accepted; however, if the IRR is less than the project's risk-adjusted cost of capital, then the project should be rejected ✓✓✓. Because of the IRR reinvestment rate assumption, when mutually exclusive projects are evaluated the IRR approach can lead to conflicting results from the NPV method. Two basic conditions can lead to conflicts between NPV and IRR: ✔ differences (earlier cash flows in…
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