each child fetch b. Jill and Jack's parents are worried that the two chil- dren don't cooperate enough with one another. Sup pose they make Jill and Jack share equally their revenues from selling the water. Given that both are self-interested, construct the payoff matrix for the decisions Jill and Jack face regarding the number of pails of water each should carry. What is the equi- librium outcome? 8. The owner of a thriving business wants to open a new office in a distant city. If he can hire someone who will manage the new office honestly, he can afford to nay that person a weekly salary of $2,000 ($1,000 more than the manager would be able to earn elsewhere) and still earn an economic profit of $800. The owner's con- cern is that he will not be able to monitor the manager's behavior and that the manager would therefore be in a position to embezzle money from the business. The Owner knows that if the remote office is managed dis- knowing the other other to a. Does b. How see w equili highe honestly, the manager can earn $3,100, which results in an economic loss of $600 per week. (LO3) a. If the owner believes that all managers are narrowly self-interested income maximizers, will he open the C. Is thi d. Supp Playe A ch new office? or sh D. Suppose the owner knows that a managerial candidate Is a devoutly religious person who condemns dishonest behavior and who would be willing to pay up to $15,000 to avoid the guilt she would feel if she were dshonest. Will the owner open the remote office? e. Supp that outc 10. Imagine 9. Consider the following "dating game," which has two players, A and B, and two strategies, to buy a movie ticket or a baseball ticket. The payoffs, given in points, are as shown in the matrix below. Note that the highest payoffs occur when both A and B attend the same event. lot that so that at the s takes y spot be ing to t0 avo

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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8a and 8b 

each child fetch
b. Jill and Jack's parents are worried that the two chil-
dren don't cooperate enough with one another. Sup
pose they make Jill and Jack share equally their
revenues from selling the water. Given that both are
self-interested, construct the payoff matrix for the
decisions Jill and Jack face regarding the number of
pails of water each should carry. What is the
equi-
librium outcome?
8. The owner of a thriving business wants to open a new
office in a distant city. If he can hire someone who will
manage the new office honestly, he can afford to nay
Transcribed Image Text:each child fetch b. Jill and Jack's parents are worried that the two chil- dren don't cooperate enough with one another. Sup pose they make Jill and Jack share equally their revenues from selling the water. Given that both are self-interested, construct the payoff matrix for the decisions Jill and Jack face regarding the number of pails of water each should carry. What is the equi- librium outcome? 8. The owner of a thriving business wants to open a new office in a distant city. If he can hire someone who will manage the new office honestly, he can afford to nay
that person a weekly salary of $2,000 ($1,000 more
than the manager would be able to earn elsewhere) and
still earn an economic profit of $800. The owner's con-
cern is that he will not be able to monitor the manager's
behavior and that the manager would therefore be in a
position to embezzle money from the business. The
Owner knows that if the remote office is managed dis-
knowing
the other
other to
a. Does
b. How
see w
equili
highe
honestly, the manager can earn $3,100, which results in
an economic loss of $600 per week. (LO3)
a. If the owner believes that all managers are narrowly
self-interested income maximizers, will he open the
C. Is thi
d. Supp
Playe
A ch
new office?
or sh
D. Suppose the owner knows that a managerial candidate
Is a devoutly religious person who condemns dishonest
behavior and who would be willing to pay up to
$15,000 to avoid the guilt she would feel if she were
dshonest. Will the owner open the remote office?
e. Supp
that
outc
10. Imagine
9. Consider the following "dating game," which has two
players, A and B, and two strategies, to buy a movie
ticket or a baseball ticket. The payoffs, given in points,
are as shown in the matrix below. Note that the highest
payoffs occur when both A and B attend the same event.
lot that
so that
at the s
takes y
spot be
ing to
t0 avo
Transcribed Image Text:that person a weekly salary of $2,000 ($1,000 more than the manager would be able to earn elsewhere) and still earn an economic profit of $800. The owner's con- cern is that he will not be able to monitor the manager's behavior and that the manager would therefore be in a position to embezzle money from the business. The Owner knows that if the remote office is managed dis- knowing the other other to a. Does b. How see w equili highe honestly, the manager can earn $3,100, which results in an economic loss of $600 per week. (LO3) a. If the owner believes that all managers are narrowly self-interested income maximizers, will he open the C. Is thi d. Supp Playe A ch new office? or sh D. Suppose the owner knows that a managerial candidate Is a devoutly religious person who condemns dishonest behavior and who would be willing to pay up to $15,000 to avoid the guilt she would feel if she were dshonest. Will the owner open the remote office? e. Supp that outc 10. Imagine 9. Consider the following "dating game," which has two players, A and B, and two strategies, to buy a movie ticket or a baseball ticket. The payoffs, given in points, are as shown in the matrix below. Note that the highest payoffs occur when both A and B attend the same event. lot that so that at the s takes y spot be ing to t0 avo
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