Duopolists A and B face the following demand curves: QA = 100-2PA + 2PB and QB = 100 - 2PB +2PA. If both firms have zero marginal cost, what are the profit-maximizing prices and quantities? PA = 60, QA = 60, PB = 40, QB = 140. O PA = 25, QA = 100, PB = 25, QB = 100. O PA= 50, QA = 80, PB = 40, QB = 120. O PA = 50, QA = 100, PB = 50, QB = 100. O PA = 100, QA = 60, PB = 80, QB = 140.

Duopolists A and B face the following demand curves: QA = 100-2PA + 2PB and QB = 100 - 2PB +2PA. If both firms have zero marginal cost, what are the profit-maximizing prices and quantities? PA = 60, QA = 60, PB = 40, QB = 140. O PA = 25, QA = 100, PB = 25, QB = 100. O PA= 50, QA = 80, PB = 40, QB = 120. O PA = 50, QA = 100, PB = 50, QB = 100. O PA = 100, QA = 60, PB = 80, QB = 140.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.2P

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