Copeland's rule is a voting system that, like Condorcet's method, looks at one-on-one contests. It, however, takes as the election winner the candidate with the best "win-loss record." Use the following ballots to show that Copeland's rule is manipulable: Election 1 a. Who is the winner of Election 1? Number of Voters (4) first A A D second B E E B third D D E fourth B fifth E A B A b. Which voter did you chose to make the unilateral change: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th? c. Complete the Election 2 preference ballots. Remember change only one voter preference. Election 2 Number of voters (4) first second third fourth fifth d. Who is the winner of Election 2? Double check that that voter you changed unilaterally did get a preferred candidate elected.

A First Course in Probability (10th Edition)
10th Edition
ISBN:9780134753119
Author:Sheldon Ross
Publisher:Sheldon Ross
Chapter1: Combinatorial Analysis
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1.1P: a. How many different 7-place license plates are possible if the first 2 places are for letters and...
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Copeland's rule is a voting system that, like Condorcet's method, looks at one-on-one contests. It, however,
takes as the election winner the candidate with the best "win-loss record." Use the following ballots to show
that Copeland's rule is manipulable:
Election 1
a. Who is the winner of Election 1?
Number of voters (4)
first
A
C
A
D
second
В
E
B
third
D
D
E
fourth
D
fifth
E
A
В
A
b. Which voter did you chose to make the unilateral change: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th?
c. Complete the Election 2 preference ballots. Remember change only one voter preference.
Election 2
Number of voters (4)
first
second
third
fourth
fifth
d. Who is the winner of Election 2?
Double check that that voter you changed unilaterally did get a preferred candidate elected.
Transcribed Image Text:Copeland's rule is a voting system that, like Condorcet's method, looks at one-on-one contests. It, however, takes as the election winner the candidate with the best "win-loss record." Use the following ballots to show that Copeland's rule is manipulable: Election 1 a. Who is the winner of Election 1? Number of voters (4) first A C A D second В E B third D D E fourth D fifth E A В A b. Which voter did you chose to make the unilateral change: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th? c. Complete the Election 2 preference ballots. Remember change only one voter preference. Election 2 Number of voters (4) first second third fourth fifth d. Who is the winner of Election 2? Double check that that voter you changed unilaterally did get a preferred candidate elected.
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