Consider whether the promises and threats made toward each other by duopolists oligopolists are always credible (believable). Look at the figure below. Imagine that two firms will play this game twice in sequence and that each firm claims the follow policy. Each says that if both it and the other firm choose the high price in the first g then it will also choose the high price in the second game (as a reward to the other for cooperating in the first game). RareÃir's price strategy High Low $12 $15
Consider whether the promises and threats made toward each other by duopolists oligopolists are always credible (believable). Look at the figure below. Imagine that two firms will play this game twice in sequence and that each firm claims the follow policy. Each says that if both it and the other firm choose the high price in the first g then it will also choose the high price in the second game (as a reward to the other for cooperating in the first game). RareÃir's price strategy High Low $12 $15
MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications
6th Edition
ISBN:9781119256830
Author:Amos Gilat
Publisher:Amos Gilat
Chapter1: Starting With Matlab
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1P
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Transcribed Image Text:Consider whether the promises and threats made toward each other by duopolists and
oligopolists are always credible (believable). Look at the figure below. Imagine that the
two firms will play this game twice in sequence and that each firm claims the following
policy. Each says that if both it and the other firm choose the high price in the first game,
then it will also choose the high price in the second game (as a reward to the other firm
for cooperating in the first game).
RareÃir's price strategy
High
Low
$12
$15
B
High
$12
$6
$6
D
$8
Low
$15
$8
a. As a first step toward thinking about whether this policy is credible, consider the
situation facing both firms in the second game. If each firm bases its decision on what to
do in the second game entirely on the payouts facing the firms in the second game, which
strategy will each firm choose in the second game?
(Click to select)
b. Now move one step back. Imagine that it is the start of the first game and each firm
must decide what to do during the first game. Given your answer to a, is the publicly
stated policy credible? (Hint: No matter what happens in the first game, what will both
firms do in the second game?)
(Click to select)
c. Given your answers to a and b, what strategy will each firm choose in the first game?
(Click to select)
Uptown's price strategy
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