Consider two bidders who are competing for an item in an 'all-pay auction.' Bidder 1 values the item at $300, bidder 2 at $500. Independently of cach other, they both submit a bid, which can be either $0, $100, or $200. The highest bidder wins the item, but both have to pay the bid they placed. In case of a tie (both bidders placing equal bids), a fair coin is flipped to determine the winner (bidders are risk-neutral, that is, they care only about their average gains minus the cost).' (a) Represent this situation as a strategic-form game. (b) Perform the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Consider two bidders who are competing for an item in an 'all-pay auction.'
Bidder 1 values the item at $300, bidder 2 at $500. Independently of each other, they both
submit a bid, which can be either $0, $100, or $200. The highest bidder wins the item, but
both have to pay the bid they placed. In case of a tie (both bidders placing equal bids), a fair
coin is flipped to determine the winner (bidders are risk-neutral, that is, they care only about
their average gains minus the cost).'
(a)
Represent this situation as a strategic-form game.
(b)
Perform the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
(c)
the iterated elimination of dominated strategies performed in (b).
Compute the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the game that remains after
Transcribed Image Text:Consider two bidders who are competing for an item in an 'all-pay auction.' Bidder 1 values the item at $300, bidder 2 at $500. Independently of each other, they both submit a bid, which can be either $0, $100, or $200. The highest bidder wins the item, but both have to pay the bid they placed. In case of a tie (both bidders placing equal bids), a fair coin is flipped to determine the winner (bidders are risk-neutral, that is, they care only about their average gains minus the cost).' (a) Represent this situation as a strategic-form game. (b) Perform the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. (c) the iterated elimination of dominated strategies performed in (b). Compute the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the game that remains after
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