Consider the wage negotiations between Cricket Australia (CA) and the union that represents the players. Assume that Cricket Australia and the union are bargaining over how much of a $100 surplus will be split. Suppose that CA moves first and makes an offer p. The union (U) may accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected neither party gets anything (payoff of 0). If the offer is accepted the Union gets p and the CA gets 100 - p. Assume that the CA can make offers of $1, $50 or $99. Which of the following statements are true?

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Consider the wage negotiations between Cricket Australia (CA)
and the union that represents the players. Assume that Cricket
Australia and the union are bargaining over how much of a
$100 surplus will be split. Suppose that CA moves first and
makes an offer p. The union (U) may accept or reject the offer.
If the offer is rejected neither party gets anything (payoff of 0).
If the offer is accepted the Union gets p and the CA gets 100 -
p. Assume that the CA can make offers of $1, $50 or $99.
Which of the following statements are true?
0
0
0
In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium, there is a first-mover
advantage
CA and the union share the surplus equally in the credible
(subgame perfect) equilibrium.
In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium, there is a second-
mover advantage
There is one credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium
There are two credible (subgame perfect) equilibria
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the wage negotiations between Cricket Australia (CA) and the union that represents the players. Assume that Cricket Australia and the union are bargaining over how much of a $100 surplus will be split. Suppose that CA moves first and makes an offer p. The union (U) may accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected neither party gets anything (payoff of 0). If the offer is accepted the Union gets p and the CA gets 100 - p. Assume that the CA can make offers of $1, $50 or $99. Which of the following statements are true? 0 0 0 In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium, there is a first-mover advantage CA and the union share the surplus equally in the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium. In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium, there is a second- mover advantage There is one credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium There are two credible (subgame perfect) equilibria
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