Consider the strategic form game represented by the following bimatrix, where player 1 is the row and player 2 is the column player P1/P2 R а, b с, 2 M 1, 1 1,0 В 3, 2 0, 1 and where a, b, and c are numbers that are left unspecified for now. a. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? b. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a Nash equilibrium? c. For what (range of) values of a and c, the mixed strategy in which P1 plays T with probability 2 and B with probability ½ strictly dominates strategy M?

Consider the strategic form game represented by the following bimatrix, where player 1 is the row and player 2 is the column player P1/P2 R а, b с, 2 M 1, 1 1,0 В 3, 2 0, 1 and where a, b, and c are numbers that are left unspecified for now. a. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? b. For what (range of) values of a, b and c the outcome (T, L) is a Nash equilibrium? c. For what (range of) values of a and c, the mixed strategy in which P1 plays T with probability 2 and B with probability ½ strictly dominates strategy M?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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