Consider the game depicted below. Player 1 decides between A and B in stage 1 of the game, and between G and H in stage 3 (if it is reached). Player 2 decides between C and D if Player 1 chose A, or between E and F if Player 1 chose B, in stage 2 of the game. 1 A B 2 с D (3,3) (0,5) G H (4,5) (5,-1) (a) List all the possible pure strategies for each player in this game and illustrate the payoffs from each pair of strategies in a matrix. [Note: each player's strategy should prescribe an action for each of his/her information node (set), regardless of whether that node will be reached in the outcome.] (b) Identify the Nash Equilibria strategies and payoffs. (c) Which of the Nash Equilibria is/ are also subgame perfect equilibrium / equilibria? Explain. E (-1,0) 2 F
Consider the game depicted below. Player 1 decides between A and B in stage 1 of the game, and between G and H in stage 3 (if it is reached). Player 2 decides between C and D if Player 1 chose A, or between E and F if Player 1 chose B, in stage 2 of the game. 1 A B 2 с D (3,3) (0,5) G H (4,5) (5,-1) (a) List all the possible pure strategies for each player in this game and illustrate the payoffs from each pair of strategies in a matrix. [Note: each player's strategy should prescribe an action for each of his/her information node (set), regardless of whether that node will be reached in the outcome.] (b) Identify the Nash Equilibria strategies and payoffs. (c) Which of the Nash Equilibria is/ are also subgame perfect equilibrium / equilibria? Explain. E (-1,0) 2 F
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Question
A10.
![Consider the game depicted below. Player 1 decides between A and B in stage 1 of the game, and between G and
H in stage 3 (if it is reached). Player 2 decides between C and D if Player 1 chose A, or between E and F if Player 1
chose B, in stage 2 of the game.
1
A
B
2
с
D
(3,3)
(0,5)
G
H
(4,5)
(5,-1)
(a) List all the possible pure strategies for each player in this game and illustrate the payoffs from each pair of
strategies in a matrix. [Note: each player's strategy should prescribe an action for each of his/her information node
(set), regardless of whether that node will be reached in the outcome.]
(b) Identify the Nash Equilibria strategies and payoffs.
(c) Which of the Nash Equilibria is / are also subgame perfect equilibrium / equilibria? Explain.
E
(-1,0)
2
F](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Febc1a93a-928d-4c12-9d83-e580a784e36b%2F98c03885-3b34-41a0-a459-79633db47157%2Fgr4vygi_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the game depicted below. Player 1 decides between A and B in stage 1 of the game, and between G and
H in stage 3 (if it is reached). Player 2 decides between C and D if Player 1 chose A, or between E and F if Player 1
chose B, in stage 2 of the game.
1
A
B
2
с
D
(3,3)
(0,5)
G
H
(4,5)
(5,-1)
(a) List all the possible pure strategies for each player in this game and illustrate the payoffs from each pair of
strategies in a matrix. [Note: each player's strategy should prescribe an action for each of his/her information node
(set), regardless of whether that node will be reached in the outcome.]
(b) Identify the Nash Equilibria strategies and payoffs.
(c) Which of the Nash Equilibria is / are also subgame perfect equilibrium / equilibria? Explain.
E
(-1,0)
2
F
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