Consider the following three-player game (player 3 chooses A or B, the payoffs are listed in order of the player numbers):Player 2Player 2LRU2, 2,05,5, 5U4, 4, 14, 2, 8Player 1Player 1D8, 6, 80,7,4D0, 2,94, 2, 5A1. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game.2. Consider the two-period repeated game (the repeated game payoffs are simply the sums of the payoffs in the two periods). Findthe subgame-perfect equilibria of the repeated game and list the set of payoffs.

Answer - Given in the question - In the above game (Player 3 choose A or B ) Part 1 Answer - Need…

Answered: Consider the following three-player…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Consider the game in the table below. What is firm A's payoff from their best response to Firm B choosing Down? Firm A Left Straight Right Up 7,5 3,7 1,3 Firm B Middle 8,14 2,7 4,17 Down 9,13 1,3 2,16 16
Consider the extensive form game shown here. The top payoff at a terminal node is for player 1. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria for the game below.
Find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for the following two games.
Consider the following three-player game represented in extensive form: Player 3 L Player 2 Player 1 R Player 2 U D Player 3 (0,2,0) U D U D (0, 1, 1) (0, 3, k) (0, 4, 3) (0,4,2) U D How many pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are there in this game if k > 1? 5 3 7 1 It depends on the value of k. (2,2, 0)
Derive all Nash equilibria of the following game. a1 b1 a1 2,7 3,2 b1 0,0 4,1
In the following games, all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second. GAME 33 Player A Player B B1 10, 12 A1 A2 9,3 A3 8, 10 In Game 33 above, B2 B3 8,8 12, 10 7,6 11, 1 9,4 14, 3 B1 is a dominated strategy for Player B B2 is a dominated strategy for Player B B3 is a dominated strategy for Player B Player B has no dominated strategies.
2- Consider the following game. Player 2 Player 1 U 12, 2 | 3, 9 5, 8 4, 2 D (a) Find all the Nash equilibria, pure and mixed. (b) Suppose that the payoff of the column player u:(D, L) is reduced from 8 to 6, but all other payoffs remain the same. Again, find all the pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. (c) Compare the mixed-strategy equilibria in parts (a) and (b). Did this worsening in one of player 2's payoffs change player 2's equilibrium mixed strategy? Did it change player l's? Give some intuition.
For the game given, use the best-reply method to find the Nash equilibria.
Question 16 Consider the following Extended Form Game: A' (9,5) O {(A,B), (A', B')} A P2 B' 'A' O {(B,B), (A', B')} P1 (5,2) (8,5) B A (1,6) P2 B' P1 B What is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium? (6,7) O {(A,A), (A', A)),((A,B), (A', A')), ((A,A), (A', B')).((A,B), (A', B'))} O (((B,A), (A', A')).((B,B), (A', A')), ((B,A), (A', B')), ((B,B), (A', B'))}
For the game below, find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
Consider the payoff matrix below, which describes a symmetric A B A 17,17 0,14 B 14,0 8,8 (a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game, including any mixed strategy equilibria. (b) Draw the expected payoff difference diagram for this game, including all the Nash equilibria you found in (a). is (c) What would you expect to occur most frequently when this game played as a lab experiment? Justify your answer using your answers from (a) and (b).
8

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