Consider the following principal agent problem with adverse selection. A firm faces a worker who may be one of two types, with equal probabilities. The firm's profits from a type i worker are given by i = ei Si, i = 1, 2, where e; is the effort supplied by a type i worker and s; is the payment to a type i worker. The cost function of the more productive worker (type 1) is given by c₁ = el and the cost function of the less productive worker (type 2) is given by c₂ = 2e2. The utility function of a worker of type i is given by: u; = c; and his opportunity cost utility is u= 0. Find the solution to the firm's problem (assuming that effort is observable and contractible). = s1/2 - -
Consider the following principal agent problem with adverse selection. A firm faces a worker who may be one of two types, with equal probabilities. The firm's profits from a type i worker are given by i = ei Si, i = 1, 2, where e; is the effort supplied by a type i worker and s; is the payment to a type i worker. The cost function of the more productive worker (type 1) is given by c₁ = el and the cost function of the less productive worker (type 2) is given by c₂ = 2e2. The utility function of a worker of type i is given by: u; = c; and his opportunity cost utility is u= 0. Find the solution to the firm's problem (assuming that effort is observable and contractible). = s1/2 - -
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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![Question:
Consider the following principal agent problem with adverse selection. A firm faces
a worker who may be one of two types, with equal probabilities. The firm's profits
from a type i worker are given by πį = ¤¿
li
Si, i
1, 2, where e; is the effort
supplied by a type i worker and s; is the payment to a type i worker. The cost
function of the more productive worker (type 1) is given by c₁ = e² and the cost
function of the less productive worker (type 2) is given by c₂ = 2e2. The utility
function of a worker of type i is given by: uį = si
Si C₂ and his opportunity cost
utility is u 0. Find the solution to the firm's problem (assuming that effort is
observable and contractible).
1/2
=
Use below Methods to solve above question:
4 Principal-Agent - Hidden Information
. Consider the following principal-agent problem.
• Effort (e) is observable, so we can contract on it.
● But, the agent has some private information.
Agent:
●
• For example, suppose the agent can be either one of two "types": type 1 or 2.
● Each agent knows her type, but the principal does not.
• The principal's probability that the agent is type i is pi.
. An alternative interpretation is as follows.
● There are many agents in the population, some of type 1, others of type 2, where the proportion of type i
agents is pi.
• Now, assume that the two types differ in terms of their "productivity."
• Specifically, their effort cost functions are different.
. Let the cost functions of the two types be given by:
c²
where
and 0² =
0² 6(e) >
● thus, marginal costs for type 2 are also higher:
Let s; be the firm's payment to a type i agent.
• The utility function of a type i agent is given by:
=
. The firm is, therefore, also risk-neutral.
u² : = si − 0¹ þ(ei)
oi p(ei)).
• Assume that the opportunity cost utility for a type i agent is u? (we can take it as u = 0).
The Firm:
● Let the firm's profits from a type i agent be given by:
The agent is, therefore, risk-neutral (his utility is linear in s; –
●
0² (ei)
oʻ(ei) > 0, ø″(ei) > 0
Oh > 0² = 0¹ ⇒
0¹ (e) for all e,
0² þ′(e) > 0¹ þ′(e) for all e
$1
Ti = ei Si
-
4.3 Case II: Hidden Information
● Again, remember that effort is observable, but whereas agents know their type, the firm does not.
• The firm's problem is to choose "two packages," (e₁, 8₁) and (e2, 82), each designed to be attractive only to one
(the correct one) type, such that expected profits are maximized:
-
max (e₁ - 81)p1 + (e₂ - $2)p2 :
ei, si
participation constraints
● This can be re-written as:
$₁0¹0(e₁) $2 - 0¹0(e₂)
≥
52-0² (е₂) ≥ 8₁-
0² 0(e₁)
S2
$1
8₁ - 0¹6(e₁) ≥ 0
pc1 = pcl
S20² (₂) ≥ 0
pc2 = pch
incentive compatibility constraints
S2 =
0² 0(e₂)
ICC1= ICCI
ICC2 = ICCh
. Note that this implies that type 1 will also participate.
• Why?
● Since type 1 can always "pretend" to be type 2 and then receive:
$2 − 0¹ 0(e₂) > s2 – 0² (€₂) = 0
-
● The constraint ICC1 ensures that a type 1 agent is better off accepting the package designed for her (rather
than pretending to be a type 2 agent).
● The constraint ICC2 ensures that a type 2 agent is better off accepting the package designed for her (rather
than pretending to be a type 1 agent).
Consider
and pc2:
pc1
• For a type 2 to accept, we need s2 ≥ 0² 0(e₂).
• But, since the firm wants to make the payment as low as possible, it will set:
=
(32)
$₁0¹0(e₁) ≥ s₂ - 0¹¹ (е₂):
S2
0² 0(e2) — 0¹ 0(e₂) (0² - 0¹) (e₂) > 0
since 0² >
01
(33)
● Again, note that from the above, we see that type 1 extracts a surplus:
$1
$₁ - 0¹¹ (е₁) > 0
• But, to prevent type 1 from acting as type 2, it is sufficient to set:
$₁ - 0¹6(e₁) = (02² - 0¹) (e₂)
(43)
(44)
i.e., if she acts like a type 2, she will get a strictly positive surplus.
• This says that if type 2 participates, type 1 will also participate.
Next, consider the two incentive compatibility constraints ICC1 and
ICC2:
(45)
(46)
(47)
=
(48)
(49)
• Primarily, we are interested in revealing type 1 (low-cost type).
• We will, therefore, concentrate on Icci rather than IcC2.
Later, we will show that if Icc₁ holds, so does ICC2.
• Hence, plugging pc2 (50) into ICC1(48), we get that in order to prevent type 1 from acting as type 2, we have
to satisfy the ICC1:
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
$₁ = 0¹ 6(e₁) + (0² – 0¹) (e2)
● Condition (57) will make type 1 (just) indifferent between acting her type or pretending to be a type 2.
● In other words, it does not leave any extra surplus over and above what is necessary to prevent type 1 from
pretending to be type 2.
(57)](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F09238b20-1e79-43dc-b0a6-3d40e032e374%2Fe884147a-f86b-491e-9a71-99eb53fcce86%2Fybu71jk_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Question:
Consider the following principal agent problem with adverse selection. A firm faces
a worker who may be one of two types, with equal probabilities. The firm's profits
from a type i worker are given by πį = ¤¿
li
Si, i
1, 2, where e; is the effort
supplied by a type i worker and s; is the payment to a type i worker. The cost
function of the more productive worker (type 1) is given by c₁ = e² and the cost
function of the less productive worker (type 2) is given by c₂ = 2e2. The utility
function of a worker of type i is given by: uį = si
Si C₂ and his opportunity cost
utility is u 0. Find the solution to the firm's problem (assuming that effort is
observable and contractible).
1/2
=
Use below Methods to solve above question:
4 Principal-Agent - Hidden Information
. Consider the following principal-agent problem.
• Effort (e) is observable, so we can contract on it.
● But, the agent has some private information.
Agent:
●
• For example, suppose the agent can be either one of two "types": type 1 or 2.
● Each agent knows her type, but the principal does not.
• The principal's probability that the agent is type i is pi.
. An alternative interpretation is as follows.
● There are many agents in the population, some of type 1, others of type 2, where the proportion of type i
agents is pi.
• Now, assume that the two types differ in terms of their "productivity."
• Specifically, their effort cost functions are different.
. Let the cost functions of the two types be given by:
c²
where
and 0² =
0² 6(e) >
● thus, marginal costs for type 2 are also higher:
Let s; be the firm's payment to a type i agent.
• The utility function of a type i agent is given by:
=
. The firm is, therefore, also risk-neutral.
u² : = si − 0¹ þ(ei)
oi p(ei)).
• Assume that the opportunity cost utility for a type i agent is u? (we can take it as u = 0).
The Firm:
● Let the firm's profits from a type i agent be given by:
The agent is, therefore, risk-neutral (his utility is linear in s; –
●
0² (ei)
oʻ(ei) > 0, ø″(ei) > 0
Oh > 0² = 0¹ ⇒
0¹ (e) for all e,
0² þ′(e) > 0¹ þ′(e) for all e
$1
Ti = ei Si
-
4.3 Case II: Hidden Information
● Again, remember that effort is observable, but whereas agents know their type, the firm does not.
• The firm's problem is to choose "two packages," (e₁, 8₁) and (e2, 82), each designed to be attractive only to one
(the correct one) type, such that expected profits are maximized:
-
max (e₁ - 81)p1 + (e₂ - $2)p2 :
ei, si
participation constraints
● This can be re-written as:
$₁0¹0(e₁) $2 - 0¹0(e₂)
≥
52-0² (е₂) ≥ 8₁-
0² 0(e₁)
S2
$1
8₁ - 0¹6(e₁) ≥ 0
pc1 = pcl
S20² (₂) ≥ 0
pc2 = pch
incentive compatibility constraints
S2 =
0² 0(e₂)
ICC1= ICCI
ICC2 = ICCh
. Note that this implies that type 1 will also participate.
• Why?
● Since type 1 can always "pretend" to be type 2 and then receive:
$2 − 0¹ 0(e₂) > s2 – 0² (€₂) = 0
-
● The constraint ICC1 ensures that a type 1 agent is better off accepting the package designed for her (rather
than pretending to be a type 2 agent).
● The constraint ICC2 ensures that a type 2 agent is better off accepting the package designed for her (rather
than pretending to be a type 1 agent).
Consider
and pc2:
pc1
• For a type 2 to accept, we need s2 ≥ 0² 0(e₂).
• But, since the firm wants to make the payment as low as possible, it will set:
=
(32)
$₁0¹0(e₁) ≥ s₂ - 0¹¹ (е₂):
S2
0² 0(e2) — 0¹ 0(e₂) (0² - 0¹) (e₂) > 0
since 0² >
01
(33)
● Again, note that from the above, we see that type 1 extracts a surplus:
$1
$₁ - 0¹¹ (е₁) > 0
• But, to prevent type 1 from acting as type 2, it is sufficient to set:
$₁ - 0¹6(e₁) = (02² - 0¹) (e₂)
(43)
(44)
i.e., if she acts like a type 2, she will get a strictly positive surplus.
• This says that if type 2 participates, type 1 will also participate.
Next, consider the two incentive compatibility constraints ICC1 and
ICC2:
(45)
(46)
(47)
=
(48)
(49)
• Primarily, we are interested in revealing type 1 (low-cost type).
• We will, therefore, concentrate on Icci rather than IcC2.
Later, we will show that if Icc₁ holds, so does ICC2.
• Hence, plugging pc2 (50) into ICC1(48), we get that in order to prevent type 1 from acting as type 2, we have
to satisfy the ICC1:
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
$₁ = 0¹ 6(e₁) + (0² – 0¹) (e2)
● Condition (57) will make type 1 (just) indifferent between acting her type or pretending to be a type 2.
● In other words, it does not leave any extra surplus over and above what is necessary to prevent type 1 from
pretending to be type 2.
(57)
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