Consider the following game. There are two players: an incumbent (denoted by I) and a potential entrant to the market (denoted by E). The entrant has two actions: it can either enter the market in which the incumbent operates, or not enter. The incumbent has two actions: it can either fight the entrant, or accommodate. The payoffs are as follows: if E enters and I fights, E gets -5 and I gets 5. If E enters and I accommodates, then both get the payoff 10. If E does not enter, I gets 20 and E gets 0. 1. Suppose that both players act simultaneously. Depict the game with the help of a game matrix. (a) Find the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Find the Nash equilibria mixed strategies. 2. Now suppose that E moves first, and then I follows.

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Consider the following game. There are two players: an incumbent (denoted
by I) and a potential entrant to the market (denoted by E). The entrant has
two actions: it can either enter the market in which the incumbent operates, or
not enter. The incumbent has two actions: it can either fight the entrant, or
accommodate. The payoffs are as follows: if E enters and I fights, E gets -5
and I gets 5. If E enters and I accommodates, then both get the payoff 10.
If E does not enter, I gets 20 and E gets 0.
1. Suppose that both players act simultaneously. Depict the game with the
help of a game matrix.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
(b) Find the Nash equilibria in mixed strategies.
2. Now suppose that E moves first, and then I follows.
(a) Depict this sequential game with the help of a game tree.
(b) What is the equilibrium of the game? Why is it different to one of
the Nash equilibria in pure strategies (explain the reasoning in 4-5
sentences)?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the following game. There are two players: an incumbent (denoted by I) and a potential entrant to the market (denoted by E). The entrant has two actions: it can either enter the market in which the incumbent operates, or not enter. The incumbent has two actions: it can either fight the entrant, or accommodate. The payoffs are as follows: if E enters and I fights, E gets -5 and I gets 5. If E enters and I accommodates, then both get the payoff 10. If E does not enter, I gets 20 and E gets 0. 1. Suppose that both players act simultaneously. Depict the game with the help of a game matrix. (a) Find the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Find the Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. 2. Now suppose that E moves first, and then I follows. (a) Depict this sequential game with the help of a game tree. (b) What is the equilibrium of the game? Why is it different to one of the Nash equilibria in pure strategies (explain the reasoning in 4-5 sentences)?
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