Consider the folliwng 3 x 3 two player normal form game that is being repeated infinite number of times. The strategy for player 2 is to play Z all thetime. Player 1 is confused between two strategies: (i) play C all the time, and (ii) play A all the time. The discounting factor for player 1 is ố1 = 0.52and the discounting factor for player 2 is 82 = 0.51.XY(31 , 31)(41 , 90)(36 , 31)(33, 22)(18 , 36)(26 , 53)A(35 , 56)C(26 , 15)(41 , 69)a. Find the total discounted utility for both player 1 and player 2 if player 1 decides to play the first stratgy (playing C all the time). [b. Find the total discounted utility for both player 1 and player 2 if player 1 decides to play the second stratgy (playing A all the time).c. Out of these two strategies, which one should player 1 choose? Why? (Use maximum 3 sentences)

Answer:- (a) When P2 always play Y, then Eqm each pd(A,Y)=(21,28) For…

Answered: Consider the folliwng 3 x 3 two player…

MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications

6th Edition

ISBN:9781119256830

Author:Amos Gilat

Publisher:Amos Gilat

Chapter1: Starting With Matlab

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1P

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consider the ff game in the normal form: which of the ff is true: a. the game has dominant equilibrium A3, B3 b. A3 always dominates A2 c. A3 is a dominant strategy for Player A d. B3 is a dominant strategy for Player B
My neighborhood has a lot of dogs. In fact, when I walk my dog, Wrigley, only 2% of the time do we not see any other dogs. Gary has three dogs (Salsa, Nacho, and Dublin), and we see only Gary and his dogs about 30% of the time when we are on a walk. Lesley has two dogs (Buster and Oreo), and we see only Lesley and her dogs 20% of the time when we are on a walk. Gary and Lesley’s dogs don’t get along; we never see them at the same time. Margo has one dog (Bond), and we see only Margo and Bond 25% of the time when we are on a walk. 10% of the time we see Margo and Lesley. What is the probability that Wrigley and I see both Gary (Salsa, Nacho and Dublin) and Margo (Bond) on a walk? What is the probability we see at least one dog owner on our walk? What is the probability we see only Margo or only Gary? Are the events seeing Gary and seeing Margo independent? EXPLAIN briefly. Are the events of seeing Lesley and seeing Gary mutually exclusive? EXPLAIN briefly.
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In this Decision Point activity, you began to explore game theory: specifically, how your outcomes are dependent not just on your own choices, but also on the reactions of competitors. Use what you learned from this decision point, and information from the chapter to answer the following question. Suppose Nike and Adidas are considering whether to develop new advertising campaigns. For each pair of strategies, the blue triangle shows Nike's payoff and the yellow triangle shows Adidas's payoff, in billions. Use this information to complete the sentences. Adidas's choices Advertise Do not advertise Advertise $6b Nike's choices -$3b $6b $14b Do not advertise $14b $10b -$3b $10b The best outcome for Nike is to choose and for Adidas to choose If Adidas chooses not to advertise, their best result will happen if Nike chooses The Nash equilibrium for this advertising game is for Nike to choose and for Adidas Answer Bank to advertise not to advertise
Please can I have help with Part D
1 Find the set of best answers to the mixed strategy x = G33) for the game A = -1 1 1 -1
What is the maximum profit of this pure strategy game: 6 4 2 -1 Select one: O a. -1 O b. 6 O c. 4 O d. 2
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am. 104.

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