Consider the folliwng 3 x 3 two player normal form game that is being repeated infinite number of times. The strategy for player 2 is to play Z all thetime. Player 1 is confused between two strategies: (i) play C all the time, and (ii) play A all the time. The discounting factor for player 1 is ố1 = 0.52and the discounting factor for player 2 is 82 = 0.51.XY(31 , 31)(41 , 90)(36 , 31)(33, 22)(18 , 36)(26 , 53)A(35 , 56)C(26 , 15)(41 , 69)a. Find the total discounted utility for both player 1 and player 2 if player 1 decides to play the first stratgy (playing C all the time). [b. Find the total discounted utility for both player 1 and player 2 if player 1 decides to play the second stratgy (playing A all the time).c. Out of these two strategies, which one should player 1 choose? Why? (Use maximum 3 sentences)

Answer:- (a) When P2 always play Y, then Eqm each pd(A,Y)=(21,28) For…

Answered: Consider the folliwng 3 x 3 two player…

MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications

6th Edition

ISBN:9781119256830

Author:Amos Gilat

Publisher:Amos Gilat

Chapter1: Starting With Matlab

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1P

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In this Decision Point activity, you began to explore game theory: specifically, how your outcomes are dependent not just on your own choices, but also on the reactions of competitors. Use what you learned from this decision point, and information from the chapter to answer the following question. Suppose Nike and Adidas are considering whether to develop new advertising campaigns. For each pair of strategies, the blue triangle shows Nike's payoff and the yellow triangle shows Adidas's payoff, in billions. Use this information to complete the sentences. Adidas's choices Advertise Do not advertise Advertise $6b Nike's choices -$3b $6b $14b Do not advertise $14b $10b -$3b $10b The best outcome for Nike is to choose and for Adidas to choose If Adidas chooses not to advertise, their best result will happen if Nike chooses The Nash equilibrium for this advertising game is for Nike to choose and for Adidas Answer Bank to advertise not to advertise
The following game is played by 2 players Solve the equilibrium for this game.
several pows are told by the king of enemies that they will put to sleep by injection and the next morning each of them will wake up with a green or red hat on. Each will see the color of each other but not of their own. The will ask the color of each own hat and the pow will be killed if the guess will be wrong. The pows need to establish a strategy that will guarantee survival of all of them except possibly one.
1. Suppose two roommates i = 1,2 must decide how much time, 5< tį < 10 (and integer), to spend on cleaning their apartment. The payoff (per unit) to roommate i = 1,2 is given by the following function: (20i Pij (50j – 30i if j 2i if j
Joe and Maggie take turns mowing the lawn each week. Maggie suggests they try a new system for determining who should mow the lawn. Each week, they will roll two dice and determine the sum of the values. Since the highest possible sum is 12, Maggie will mow the lawn if the sum is 6 or less, and Joe will mow the lawn if the sum is greater than 6. Before agreeing to Maggie's suggestion, Joe wants to check if this plan would be fair. He decides to roll a pair of dice and determine the sum of the values 100 times. The graph shows the results of the 100 trials. Based on his simulation, should Joe agree to Maggie’s plan? (yes/no), because a sum greater than 6 is likely to occur (more than, less then, equal to)(30%, 50%, 75%) of the time
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