A2 Consider a used car market where buyers cannot observe the car's true quality until afterpurchase but sellers know the car's true quality. There are four possible car types in the usedcar market - junky, poor, satisfactory, and good - and buyers know the distribution of car typeseven though they cannot observe the quality of the car owned by each individual seller. Use thetable below to answer the following questions.Car'sQualityJunkyPoorSatisfactoryGoodProportioncars0.20.30.40.1Buyer's ValueOf Car$300$800$5,000$10,000ASeller'sReservation Valueof Car$50$200$2,000$8,000A Bayesian Nash equilibrium does exist where only junky, poor, and satisfactory cars are sold. Thatis, good cars do not sell in the used car market.Knowing this, what is the highest possible price at which the junky, poor, and satisfactory cars canbe sold? Round your answer to the nearest dollar and leave the $ sign out of your answer.

Game theory uses the idea of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Players in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium give…

Consider a used car market where buyers cannot observe the car's true quality until after purchase but sellers know the car's true quality. There are four possible car types in the used car market - junky, poor, satisfactory, and good - and buyers know the distribution of car types even though they cannot observe the quality of the car owned by each individual seller. Use the table below to answer the following questions. Car's Quality Junky Poor Satisfactory Good Proportion of cars 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 Buyer's Value Of Car $300 $800 $5,000 $10,000 Seller's Reservation Value of Car $50 $200 $2,000 $8,000 Bayesian Nash equilibrium does exist where only junky, poor, and satisfactory cars are sold. That

Consider a used car market where buyers cannot observe the car's true quality until after purchase but sellers know the car's true quality. There are four possible car types in the used car market - junky, poor, satisfactory, and good - and buyers know the distribution of car types even though they cannot observe the quality of the car owned by each individual seller. Use the table below to answer the following questions. Car's Quality Junky Poor Satisfactory Good Proportion of cars 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 Buyer's Value Of Car $300 $800 $5,000 $10,000 Seller's Reservation Value of Car $50 $200 $2,000 $8,000 Bayesian Nash equilibrium does exist where only junky, poor, and satisfactory cars are sold. That

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter16: Information, Risk, And Insurance

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20CTQ: A website offers a place for people to buy and sell emeralds, but information about emeralds can be...

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