Consider a used car market where buyers cannot observe the car's true quality until after purchase but sellers know the car's true quality. There are four possible car types in the used car market - junky, poor, satisfactory, and good - and buyers know the distribution of car types even though they cannot observe the quality of the car owned by each individual seller. Use the table below to answer the following questions.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Consider a used car market where buyers cannot observe the car's true quality until after
purchase but sellers know the car's true quality. There are four possible car types in the used
car market - junky, poor, satisfactory, and good - and buyers know the distribution of car types
even though they cannot observe the quality of the car owned by each individual seller. Use the
table below to answer the following questions.
Car's
Quality
Junky
Poor
|
Satisfactory
Good
Proportion
of cars
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.1
Buyer's Value
Of Car
$300
$800
$5,000
$10,000
Seller's
Reservation Value
of Car
$50
$200
$2,000
$8,000
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium does exist where only junky, poor, and satisfactory cars are sold. That
is, good cars do not sell in the used car market.
Knowing this, what is the highest possible price at which the junky, poor, and satisfactory cars can
be sold? Round your answer to the nearest dollar and leave the $ sign out of your answer.
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a used car market where buyers cannot observe the car's true quality until after purchase but sellers know the car's true quality. There are four possible car types in the used car market - junky, poor, satisfactory, and good - and buyers know the distribution of car types even though they cannot observe the quality of the car owned by each individual seller. Use the table below to answer the following questions. Car's Quality Junky Poor | Satisfactory Good Proportion of cars 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 Buyer's Value Of Car $300 $800 $5,000 $10,000 Seller's Reservation Value of Car $50 $200 $2,000 $8,000 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium does exist where only junky, poor, and satisfactory cars are sold. That is, good cars do not sell in the used car market. Knowing this, what is the highest possible price at which the junky, poor, and satisfactory cars can be sold? Round your answer to the nearest dollar and leave the $ sign out of your answer.
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