help 5. Consider a society consisting of two individuals, Prude (7) and Lewd (A), and abook, Lady Chatterley's Lover. At most one individual may hold the book, so theonly three available alternatives are that nobody reads the book (Ø), only Prude readsit ({7}), or only Lewd does ({A}). Lewd prefers to read the book than to not readit, but would prefer it even more if Prude read it instead. Prude, however, believesthat nobody ought to read the book, but, if somebody must, he would be the betterchoice of reader. Formally, {T}Px{\}P,Ø and ØPr{T}Pr{A}.A social welfare function is liberal if, assuming that the book is given to Prude orLewd, society's preference over whether Prude or Lewd reads it agrees with the bookrecipient's preference. Show that no social welfare function can be liberal, unanimous,complete and quasi-transitive. (A binary relation is quasi-transitive if its asymmetricpart is transitive; its symmetric part need not be.)

Lady Chatterley was a character in D.H. Lawrence's novel named "Lady Chatterley's Lover". The book…

Consider a society consisting of two individuals, Prude (7) and Lewd (A), and a book, Lady Chatterley's Lover. At most one individual may hold the book, so the only three available alternatives are that nobody reads the book (Ø), only Prude reads it ({a}), or only Lewd does ({A}). Lewd prefers to read the book than to not read it, but would prefer it even more if Prude read it instead. Prude, however, believes that nobody ought to read the book, but, if somebody must, he would be the better

Consider a society consisting of two individuals, Prude (7) and Lewd (A), and a book, Lady Chatterley's Lover. At most one individual may hold the book, so the only three available alternatives are that nobody reads the book (Ø), only Prude reads it ({a}), or only Lewd does ({A}). Lewd prefers to read the book than to not read it, but would prefer it even more if Prude read it instead. Prude, however, believes that nobody ought to read the book, but, if somebody must, he would be the better

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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