Consider a bargaing game with alternating offers with two players: In each round, one player makes a proposal how a pie of size 1 should be divided. Divisions are denoted (1, 2) where x1 and 2 are the shares of the two players. Player 1 has a constant discount rate of $1 and player 2 has a constant discount rate of 82 = 7. = Different from the standard model, we consider the case where player 2 can choose an outside option after player 1 has made an offer and that offer was rejected by player 2. If player 2 chooses the outside option, player 2 obtains band player 1 obtains nothing. a. How much will player 1 demand for themself in the first round? b. How much will player 1 offer to player 2 in the first round?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Consider a bargaing game with alternating offers with two players: In each round, one player makes a
proposal how a pie of size 1 should be divided. Divisions are denoted (1, 2) where x1 and 2 are the
shares of the two players. Player 1 has a constant discount rate of $1 and player 2 has a constant
discount rate of 82 = 7.
=
Different from the standard model, we consider the case where player 2 can choose an outside option after
player 1 has made an offer and that offer was rejected by player 2.
If player 2 chooses the outside option, player 2 obtains band player 1 obtains nothing.
a. How much will player 1 demand for themself in the first round?
b. How much will player 1 offer to player 2 in the first round?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a bargaing game with alternating offers with two players: In each round, one player makes a proposal how a pie of size 1 should be divided. Divisions are denoted (1, 2) where x1 and 2 are the shares of the two players. Player 1 has a constant discount rate of $1 and player 2 has a constant discount rate of 82 = 7. = Different from the standard model, we consider the case where player 2 can choose an outside option after player 1 has made an offer and that offer was rejected by player 2. If player 2 chooses the outside option, player 2 obtains band player 1 obtains nothing. a. How much will player 1 demand for themself in the first round? b. How much will player 1 offer to player 2 in the first round?
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