urgent please help i need a explain solution step by step 6A. How is the Pigou tax computed (write down carefully the way it iscomputed in a simple two-firm competitive environment)? What is its aim?6B. The preferences of agents A and B are representable by expected utilityfunctions such that ua(z) - 5z/3 + 30, and up(z)following allocation of the expected returns of a risky joint investment of A andB as represented by lottery L= (:1500), (:120)) is Pareto-efficient:(a) ZA = (500,100), zn - (1000,20)(b) ZA = (100,100), ra= (1300,20)(c) A = (80,80), rB - (1420,40)(d) FA = (750,60), an- (750,60)(e) NOPAC.ka - 20. Then, the%3D

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BA. How is the Pigou tax computed (write down carefully the way it is computed in a simple two-firm competitive environment)? What is its aim? 6B. The preferences of agents A and B are representable by expected utility functious such that uA(z) - 5z/3 + 30, and un(z) - kr following allocation of the expected returns of a risky joint investment of A and B as represented by lottery L= ((:1500), (:120)) is Pareto-efficient: (a) ZA = (500,100), zn (b) ZA - (100,100), rp (c) ZA (d) ZA - (750,60), n (e) NOPAC. 20. Then, the (1000,20) (1300,20) (80,80), n - (1420,40) (750,00)

BA. How is the Pigou tax computed (write down carefully the way it is computed in a simple two-firm competitive environment)? What is its aim? 6B. The preferences of agents A and B are representable by expected utility functious such that uA(z) - 5z/3 + 30, and un(z) - kr following allocation of the expected returns of a risky joint investment of A and B as represented by lottery L= ((:1500), (:120)) is Pareto-efficient: (a) ZA = (500,100), zn (b) ZA - (100,100), rp (c) ZA (d) ZA - (750,60), n (e) NOPAC. 20. Then, the (1000,20) (1300,20) (80,80), n - (1420,40) (750,00)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.10P

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