(b) Bidders do not have budget constraints. Bidder 1 is special. He values the two objects individually at 50 and 85; respectively. But this bidder's valuation for the bundle of the two objects is 140 (which is greater than the sum of 50 and 85). That is to say, if bidder 1 gets only object 1 and the price is 30, his net payoff will be 50 30 = 20; but if he gets both objects at prices 30 and 20, his net payoff will be 140 - 30 - 20 = 90. The greater valuation for the bundle may come from economies of scales, market power, etc. What should bidder 1 do in the auction (according to the auction rule for Question 1. Question 1: What should a bidder do if his valuations for the two objects are 50 and 60)? Explain.
(b) Bidders do not have budget constraints. Bidder 1 is special. He values the two objects individually at 50 and 85; respectively. But this bidder's valuation for the bundle of the two objects is 140 (which is greater than the sum of 50 and 85). That is to say, if bidder 1 gets only object 1 and the price is 30, his net payoff will be 50 30 = 20; but if he gets both objects at prices 30 and 20, his net payoff will be 140 - 30 - 20 = 90. The greater valuation for the bundle may come from economies of scales, market power, etc. What should bidder 1 do in the auction (according to the auction rule for Question 1. Question 1: What should a bidder do if his valuations for the two objects are 50 and 60)? Explain.
Essentials Of Investments
11th Edition
ISBN:9781260013924
Author:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Publisher:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1PS
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Please answer part (b)
Question: In real-world FCC auctions, there are other complications. We consider two of them below.
(a) Bidder 1 is financially constrained (while the two other bidders are not). Suppose bidder 1's valuations for the two objects are 50 and 60; respectively, but his total budget is 100. What should this bidder do in the auction (according to the auction rule for Question 1 - question 1: What should a bidder do if his valuations for the two objects are 50 and 60?); respectively? Explain.
(a) Bidder 1 is financially constrained (while the two other bidders are not). Suppose bidder 1's valuations for the two objects are 50 and 60; respectively, but his total budget is 100. What should this bidder do in the auction (according to the auction rule for Question 1 - question 1: What should a bidder do if his valuations for the two objects are 50 and 60?); respectively? Explain.
(b) Bidders do not have budget constraints. Bidder 1 is special. He values the two objects individually at 50 and 85; respectively. But this bidder's valuation for the bundle of the two objects is 140 (which is greater than the sum of 50 and 85). That is to say, if bidder 1 gets only object 1 and the price is 30, his net payoff will be 50 30 = 20; but if he gets both objects at prices 30 and 20, his net payoff will be 140 - 30 - 20 = 90. The greater valuation for the bundle may come from economies of scales, market power, etc. What should bidder 1 do in the auction (according to the auction rule for Question 1. Question 1: What should a bidder do if his valuations for the two objects are 50 and 60)? Explain.
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