Assume for this question the principal wants to achieve the bad effort at the lowest cost then what is: the expected wage if effort is contractible minus the expected wage if effort is not contractible? Answer to at most 2 decimal places (rounded), do not include a dollar sign in your answer. Answer:

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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D4)
Assume, in producing one unit of a good X, an agent can exert either the good effort (G) or the bad effort (L), which cause production defects with probability 0.25 or
0.75 respectively. His utility function in effort e and wage w is U (w, e) = 100 - (10/w) - c(e) where c(G) = 2 for the good effort and c(L) = () for the bad
effort. Production defects are contractible and so can be included in the agent's contract, but effort is not contractible. Good X sells for $20 if there are no defects and
$0 otherwise. The principal is risk-neutral and likes profit. Assume the agent has a reservation utility/outside option of U=0.
Assume for this question the principal wants to achieve the bad effort at the lowest cost then what is: the expected wage if effort is contractible minus the expected
wage if effort is not contractible? Answer to at most 2 decimal places (rounded), do not include a dollar sign in your answer.
Answer:
Transcribed Image Text:Assume, in producing one unit of a good X, an agent can exert either the good effort (G) or the bad effort (L), which cause production defects with probability 0.25 or 0.75 respectively. His utility function in effort e and wage w is U (w, e) = 100 - (10/w) - c(e) where c(G) = 2 for the good effort and c(L) = () for the bad effort. Production defects are contractible and so can be included in the agent's contract, but effort is not contractible. Good X sells for $20 if there are no defects and $0 otherwise. The principal is risk-neutral and likes profit. Assume the agent has a reservation utility/outside option of U=0. Assume for this question the principal wants to achieve the bad effort at the lowest cost then what is: the expected wage if effort is contractible minus the expected wage if effort is not contractible? Answer to at most 2 decimal places (rounded), do not include a dollar sign in your answer. Answer:
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