AS A FRACTION a don't know any bidder's private values, what is the expected revenue for the ce auction? A numerical answer as well as the formula you used to arrive at in (N-1 Epechd kevenue : Joe is one of the 4 bidders and values the object at $16. How much should Joe auction? A brief justification is required. Answer:

MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications
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Author:Amos Gilat
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Chapter1: Starting With Matlab
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Question
4
Problems/Short Answer
1. Suppose there are 4 risk-neutral bidders who have private values for an object that is being
sold in an auction. The private values are independent draws from a uniform distribution on the
interval [0, 30]. YOU MAY LEAVE YOUR ANSWER AS A FRACTION
i) Assuming you don't know any bidder's private values, what is the expected revenue for the
seller in a 1"-price auction? A numerical answer as well as the formula you used to arrive at it
are both required.
N-1
Espechd Rerenue : )
Answer:
ii) Suppose that Joe is one of the 4 bidders and values the object at $16. How much should Joe
bid in a 1" price auction? A brief justification is required.
Numerical Answer:
iii) Suppose the seller has learned that the four bidders have values of 16, 14, 10, and 5. Will a
risk-neutral seller prefer an ascending (English) auction or a descending (Dutch) auction? A
brief explanation is required for credit.
Numenical Tugfication
Numerical Answer:
Transcribed Image Text:Problems/Short Answer 1. Suppose there are 4 risk-neutral bidders who have private values for an object that is being sold in an auction. The private values are independent draws from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 30]. YOU MAY LEAVE YOUR ANSWER AS A FRACTION i) Assuming you don't know any bidder's private values, what is the expected revenue for the seller in a 1"-price auction? A numerical answer as well as the formula you used to arrive at it are both required. N-1 Espechd Rerenue : ) Answer: ii) Suppose that Joe is one of the 4 bidders and values the object at $16. How much should Joe bid in a 1" price auction? A brief justification is required. Numerical Answer: iii) Suppose the seller has learned that the four bidders have values of 16, 14, 10, and 5. Will a risk-neutral seller prefer an ascending (English) auction or a descending (Dutch) auction? A brief explanation is required for credit. Numenical Tugfication Numerical Answer:
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