Analysts have estimated the inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly to be P= 200 - 3(Q1 + Q2). They estimate costs to be G(Q1)= 26Q1 and C2(Q2)=32Q2- a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. Firm 1: Q₁ = Firm 2: Q2= Q2 Q1 b. Calculate each firm's equilibrium output. Firm 1: Firm 2: c. Calculate the equilibrium market price. $ d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium. Firm 1: $ Firm 2: $

Analysts have estimated the inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly to be P = 110 −3 (Q1 + Q2). They estimate costs to be C1(Q1) = 11Q1 and C2(Q2) = 29Q2.a. Determine the reaction function for each firm.  Firm 1: Q1 = − Q2   Firm 2: Q2 = − Q1b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output.  Firm 1:   Firm 2: c. Calculate the equilibrium market price.  $ d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.  Firm 1: $   Firm 2: $

The inverse demand for a homogenerous-product STakelberg duopoly is P=18,000-5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL=2,000QLand CF(QF)=4000Qf. What is the follower's reaction function? Determine equilibrium output level for both leader and follower. Determine the equilibrium market price. Determin the profits of the leader and the follower.       Please answer correct please asap please   Don't answer by pen paper plz

The (inverse) market demand function in a homogeneous product Cournot duopoly is as follows: P = 200- 10(Q1+Q2). The total cost functions are TC- 100 + 40Q1 for firm one and TC = 80 + 60Q2 for firm two. 1. Determine the reaction function for each firm. 2. Calculate each firm's equilibrium level of output. 3. Calculate the market equilibrium price. 4. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.

The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelburg duopoly is P=24000-5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower respectively are CL(QL)=3000QL and CF(QF)=4000QF.   a) What is the followers reaction function?   b) Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower.   Leader output:   Follower output:   c) Determine the equilibrium markert price   $   d) Determine the profits of the leader and the follower.   Leader profits: $   Follower profits: $

The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 100 – 2(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 20Q1 and C2(Q2) = 30Q2. a. What is the reaction function for each firm?                                                              b. What is each firm’s equilibrium output? c. What is the equilibrium market price?                                                                               d. What is the profit each firm earns in equilibrium?

A duopoly faces an inverse market demand of P(Q) = 240−Q.Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1 (q1) = ​$10.Firm​ 2's constant marginal cost is MC2 (q2) =​ $20.Assume fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Calculate the output of each​ firm, market​ output, and price if there is​ (A) a collusive equilibrium or​ (B) a Cournot equilibrium.   ​(A) Collusive equilibrium ​(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal​ places)   The collusive equilibrium occurs where q1  equals ?and q2 equals ?   Market output is ?   The collusive equilibrium price is ?     ​(B) Cournot equilibrium ​(Enter your responses using rounded to two decimal​ places)   The​ Nash-Cournot equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ? and q2  equals ?   Market output is ?   The equilibrium occurs at a price of ?

A duopoly faces an inverse market demand of P(Q) = 150−Q.Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1 (q1) = ​$30.Firm​ 2's constant marginal cost is MC2 (q2) =​ $60.Assume fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Calculate the output of each​ firm, market​ output, and price if there is​ (A) a collusive equilibrium or​ (B) a Cournot equilibrium.   ​(A) Collusive equilibrium ​(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal​ places)   The collusive equilibrium occurs where q1  equals ?and q2 equals ?   Market output is ?   The collusive equilibrium price is ?     ​(B) Cournot equilibrium ​(Enter your responses using rounded to two decimal​ places)   The​ Nash-Cournot equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ? and q2  equals ?   Market output is ?   The equilibrium occurs at a price of ? ​

Suppose that Raleigh and Dawes are the only sellers of bicycles in the UK. The inverse market demand function for bicycles is ?(?)=200−2?. Both firms have the same total cost function: ??(?)=12? and the same marginal cost: ??(?)=12.Suppose this market is a Stackelberg oligopoly and Raleigh is the first mover.a) Write down a formula for the reaction function of Dawes.b) Calculate the equilibrium quantity that each firm produces and the equilibrium price in the market.c) At the Stackelberg equilibrium, how much profit does each firm make?Suppose now that the two firms decide to act like a single monopolist.a) What will the total quantity of bicycles sold in the market be and what will the equilibrium price be? Represent the profit maximisation problem on a graph and indicate the price and quantity at the equilibrium.b) Calculate the total profit made by the two firms when they act like a monopoly. Compare it with the total profit they were making in the Stackelberg oligopoly.c) For the…

The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 200 − 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) = 32Q2. a. Determine the reaction function for each firm. b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output. c. Calculate the equilibrium market price. d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.