• An engineer has a talent t in {1,2} with equal probability (prob=1/2), and the value of t is private information to the engineer. The engineer's pure strategies are applying for a job or being an entrepreneur and doing a startup. • The company's pure strategies are either hiring or not hiring the engineer. • If the engineer applies for the job and the company does not hire, then the engineer becomes an entrepreneur and does a startup. • The utility of the engineer is t (talent) from being an entrepreneur, and w (wage) from being hired. • The utility of the company is (t-w) from hiring the engineer and 0 otherwise. • These are pictured in the payoff matrices below, with the engineer being the row player and the company being the column player.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Suppose w = 2, which of the below are pure strategy Bayesian equilibria, there may be more than one and check all that apply. (Form: Engineer's
strategy, company's strategy)
a) (t = 2 Work, t
=
1 Work, Not);
b) (t = 2 Work, t = 1 Work, Hire);
c) (t = 2 Startup, t
=
1 Work, Not);
d) (t
-
2 Startup, t =
1 Work, Hire);
Transcribed Image Text:Suppose w = 2, which of the below are pure strategy Bayesian equilibria, there may be more than one and check all that apply. (Form: Engineer's strategy, company's strategy) a) (t = 2 Work, t = 1 Work, Not); b) (t = 2 Work, t = 1 Work, Hire); c) (t = 2 Startup, t = 1 Work, Not); d) (t - 2 Startup, t = 1 Work, Hire);
4.
.
An engineer has a talent t in {1,2} with equal probability (prob=1/2), and the value of t is private information to the engineer.
The engineer's pure strategies are applying for a job or being an entrepreneur and doing a startup.
.
The company's pure strategies are either hiring or not hiring the engineer.
.
If the engineer applies for the job and the company does not hire, then the engineer becomes an entrepreneur and does a startup.
The utility of the engineer is t (talent) from being an entrepreneur, and w (wage) from being hired.
The utility of the company is (t-w) from hiring the engineer and 0 otherwise.
These are pictured in the payoff matrices below, with the engineer being the row player and the company being the column player.
t=2
Hire
Not
Startup
2,0
2,0
Work
W,2-W
2,0
t=1
Hire
Not
Startup
1,0
1,0
Work
W,1-W
1,0
Transcribed Image Text:4. . An engineer has a talent t in {1,2} with equal probability (prob=1/2), and the value of t is private information to the engineer. The engineer's pure strategies are applying for a job or being an entrepreneur and doing a startup. . The company's pure strategies are either hiring or not hiring the engineer. . If the engineer applies for the job and the company does not hire, then the engineer becomes an entrepreneur and does a startup. The utility of the engineer is t (talent) from being an entrepreneur, and w (wage) from being hired. The utility of the company is (t-w) from hiring the engineer and 0 otherwise. These are pictured in the payoff matrices below, with the engineer being the row player and the company being the column player. t=2 Hire Not Startup 2,0 2,0 Work W,2-W 2,0 t=1 Hire Not Startup 1,0 1,0 Work W,1-W 1,0
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