7 Your pharmaceutical firm is seeking to open up new international markets by partnering with various local distributors. The different distributors withina country are stronger with different market segments (hospitals, retail pharmacies, etc.) but also have substantial overlap.In Egypt, you calculate that the annual value created by one distributor is $120 milion per year, but would be $160 milion f two distributors carriedyour product line.Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture Smillion of this deal. (Hint: The two distributors areindependent of each other; therefore, you conduct separate negotiations with each.)Argentina also has two distributors that add value equivalent to the value added by the two disthibutors in Egypt, but both are run by the government.Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture smillion of this deal.In Argentina, if you do not reach an agreement with the government distnbutors, you can set up a less efficent Internet-based distribubon systemthat would generate $40 million in value to you.million of this deal.Assuming a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to captureSActivate Windows

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also'have substantial overlap. ot, you calculate that the annual value created by one distributor is $120 milion per year, but would be $160 milion f two distributors camed roduct line. ing a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture S million of this deal. (Hint: The two dstributors are ndent of each other; therefore, you conduct separate negotiations with each.) na also has two distributors that add value equivalent to the value added by the bwo disthbutors in Egypt, but both are run by the government. ng a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture S million of this deal. ntina, if you do not reach an agreement with the government distributors, you can set up a less efficient Intenet-based distribubon system uld generate $40 million in value to you. million of this deal. g a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture Activate Windoy

also'have substantial overlap. ot, you calculate that the annual value created by one distributor is $120 milion per year, but would be $160 milion f two distributors camed roduct line. ing a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture S million of this deal. (Hint: The two dstributors are ndent of each other; therefore, you conduct separate negotiations with each.) na also has two distributors that add value equivalent to the value added by the bwo disthbutors in Egypt, but both are run by the government. ng a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture S million of this deal. ntina, if you do not reach an agreement with the government distributors, you can set up a less efficient Intenet-based distribubon system uld generate $40 million in value to you. million of this deal. g a nonstrategic view of bargaining, you would expect to capture Activate Windoy

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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