Acme's Advertising Strategy Ajax's Advertising Strategy Large Budget Small Budget A B Large Budget $800 $800 $600 $1200 Small Budget C D $1200 $1000 $600 $1000 Refer to the game theory matrix, where the numerical data show the profits resulting from alternative combinations of advertising strategies for Ajax and Acme. Ajax's profits are shown in the upper right part of each cell; Acme's profits are shown in the lower left. With collusion and no cheating, the outcome of the game is cell Multiple Choice О О B. A.

please answer all of the questions. thank youuu

Don't use ai to answer I will report your answer Solve it Asap with explanation and calculation

E.  Game theory   Two firms in Ithaca both making sandwiches have two strategies available:   charge a low price and charge a high price.    In each cell (box) the first entry is the profit to Angie’s Sandwiches (AS) and the second entry is the profit per week for James Jems. (JJ)   JJ charges low price JJ charges high price AS charges low price $20,000, $20,000 $45,000, $50,000 AS charges high price $50,000, $35,000 $30,000, $30,000   1.   Is there a Nash Equilibrium?   Where is it?   Explain.   2.   In which cell will the total profit be a maximum?

Please provide answer in 1 hr please urgent

5. The following problem was first considered by John von Neumann and is a fundamentalresult game theory.A and B play the following game:ˆA writes down either number 1 or number 2, and B must guess which one.ˆIf the number that A has written down is i and B has guessed correctly, B receives i units from A.ˆIf B makes a wrong guess, B pays 4/5 of a unit to A.First we consider the expected gain of player B.ˆSuppose B guesses 1 with probability p and 2 with probability 1 −p.ˆLet X1 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 1.ˆLet X2 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 2.(a)  Find the pmf of X1 and X2(b)  Find B’s expected gain for these two cases, E[X1] and E[X2].(c)  What value of p maximizes the minimum possible value of B’s expected gain?Now consider the expected loss of player AˆSuppose that A writes down 1 with probability q and 2 with probability 1 −q.ˆLet Y1 be A’s loss (or gain) if B chooses number 1.ˆLet Y2 be A’s loss (or gain) if B…

Class Exercise Chapter 13: Game Theory Two firms are in the chocolate market. Each can choose to go for the high end of the market (high quality) or the low end (low quality). Resulting profits are given by the following payoff matrix: Firm 2 Low -20, -30 High 100, 800 Firm Low 1 High 900, 600 50, 50 a. What outcomes, if any, are Nash equilibria? b. If the managers of both firms are conservative and each follows a maximin strategy, what will be the outcome? c. What is the cooperative outcome? d. Which firm benefits most from the cooperative outcome? How much would that firm need to offer the other to persuade it to collude?

Ajax's Advertising Strategy Small Large Budget Budget Large $800 $600 Budget $800 $1200 Small $1200 $1000 Budget $600 $1000 Refer to the game theory matrix, where the numerical data show the profits resulting from alternative combinations of advertising strategies for Ajax and Acme. Ajax's profits are shown in the upper right part of each cell; Acme's profits are shown in the lower left. Without collusion, the outcome of the game is cell Acme's Advertising Strategy D.

(6) Find all the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria of the games in Figures 1 and 2 on the next page.

The attached diagram depicts two firms controlled by Jacob and Elsa, and two potential actions each firm might take. Payoffs from action combinations appear in the normal-form depiction of the game played by Jacob and Elsa. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game (Jacob's strategy listed first)? a b Jacob's Actions d Dont' Advertise Advertise, Advertise Advertise Don't Advertise J=300 J=400 Don't advertise, Don't advertise Elsa's Actions Don't advertise (Jacob), Advertise (Elsa) с Advertise (Jacob), Don't Advertise (Elsa) E=200 Selected answer will be automatically saved. For keyboard navigation, press up/down arrow keys to select an answer. E=50 Advertise J=100 J=200 E=300 E=100