according to the reading, how does John Stuart mill define liberty and can it be restrained?

Social Psychology (10th Edition)
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ISBN:9780134641287
Author:Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers
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Chapter1: Introducing Social Psychology
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according to the reading, how does John Stuart mill define liberty and can it be restrained?

John Stuart Mil
ON LIBERTY
Freedom of thought and expression were principal concerns of nineteenth-
century liberals. The classic defense of intellectual freedom is On Liberty (1859),
written by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), a prominent British philosopher.
Mill argued that no individual or government has a monopoly on truth, for all
human beings are fallible. Therefore, the government and the majority have no
legitimate authority to suppress views, however unpopular; they have no right
to interfere with a person's liberty so long as that person's actions do no injury to
others. Nothing is more absolute, contended Mill, than the inviolable right of all
adults to think and live as they please so long as they respect the rights of others.
For Mill, toleration of opposing and unpopular viewpoints is a necessary trait in
order for a person to become rational, moral, and civilized.
of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own
The object of this essay is to assert one very
simple principle, as entitled to govern ab- body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
solutely the dealings of society with the
individual... . That principle is that the sole
end for which mankind are warranted, indi-
vidually or collectively, in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number liberty of thought and feeling, absolute free-
is self-protection. That the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against theological. The liberty of expressing and pub-
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him people, but, being almost of as much impor-
to do so, because it will make him happier, be-
cause, in the opinions of others, to do so would
be wise or even right. These are good reasons
for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, offraming
him, or persuading him, or entreating him,
but not for compelling him or visiting him
with any evil in case he do otherwise. To jus-
tify that, the conduct from which it is desired
to deter him must be calculated to produce evil
to someone else. The only part of the conduct
of anyone for which he is amenable to society is
that which concerns others. In the part which liberty, within the same limits, of combina-
merely concerns himself, his independence is,
This, then, is the appropriate region of
human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward
domain of consciousness, demanding liberty
of conscience in the most comprehensive sense,
dom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects,
practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or
lishing opinions may seem to fall under a differ-
ent principle, since it belongs to that part of the
conduct of an individual which concerns other
tance as the liberty of thought itself and resting
in great part on the same reasons, is practically
inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle
the plan of our life to suit our own character, of
doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow, without impediment from
our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does
not harm them, even though they should think
our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly,
from this liberty of each individual follows the
tion among individuals; freedom to unite for
any purpose not involving harm to others: the
persons combining being supposed to be of full
age and not forced or deceived.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberry (Boston: Ticknor and Fields,
1863), pp. 22-23, 27-29, 35 36.
Transcribed Image Text:John Stuart Mil ON LIBERTY Freedom of thought and expression were principal concerns of nineteenth- century liberals. The classic defense of intellectual freedom is On Liberty (1859), written by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), a prominent British philosopher. Mill argued that no individual or government has a monopoly on truth, for all human beings are fallible. Therefore, the government and the majority have no legitimate authority to suppress views, however unpopular; they have no right to interfere with a person's liberty so long as that person's actions do no injury to others. Nothing is more absolute, contended Mill, than the inviolable right of all adults to think and live as they please so long as they respect the rights of others. For Mill, toleration of opposing and unpopular viewpoints is a necessary trait in order for a person to become rational, moral, and civilized. of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern ab- body and mind, the individual is sovereign. solutely the dealings of society with the individual... . That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, indi- vidually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number liberty of thought and feeling, absolute free- is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against theological. The liberty of expressing and pub- his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him people, but, being almost of as much impor- to do so, because it will make him happier, be- cause, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, offraming him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To jus- tify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which liberty, within the same limits, of combina- merely concerns himself, his independence is, This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, dom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or lishing opinions may seem to fall under a differ- ent principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other tance as the liberty of thought itself and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual follows the tion among individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age and not forced or deceived. John Stuart Mill, On Liberry (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1863), pp. 22-23, 27-29, 35 36.
Page 2
It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted
in accordance with public opinion than when
No society in which these liberties are not,
on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be
its form of government; and none is completely in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one
free in which they do not exist absolute and un-
qualified. The only freedom which deserves the
name is that of pursuing our own good in our
Own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal
others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain
it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health,
whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind simply a private injury, it would make some
are greater gainers by suffering each other to live
as seems good to themselves than by compelling
were of one opinion, mankind would be no
more justified in silencing that one person
than
he, if he had the power, would be justified in
possession of no value except to the owner, if
to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were
difference whether the injury was inflicted only
on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar
evil of silencing the expression of an opinion
is that it is robbing the human race, posterity
as well as the existing generation-those who
each to live as seems good to the pest. .
Let us suppose, therefore, that the
government is entirely at one with the people,
and never thinks of exerting any power of dissent from the opinion, still more than those
coercion unless in agreement with what it con-
ceives to be their voice. But 1 deny the right deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
of the people to exercise such coercion, either
by themselves or by their government. The
power itself is illegitimate. The best govern-
who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are
error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is
almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception
and livelier impression of truth produced by its
collision with error,
ment has no more title to it than the worst.
Transcribed Image Text:Page 2 It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion than when No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one free in which they do not exist absolute and un- qualified. The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our Own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind simply a private injury, it would make some are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in possession of no value except to the owner, if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation-those who each to live as seems good to the pest. . Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of dissent from the opinion, still more than those coercion unless in agreement with what it con- ceives to be their voice. But 1 deny the right deprived of the opportunity of exchanging of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best govern- who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error, ment has no more title to it than the worst.
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