A thousand used cars are for sale in Boston. Some of the cars are of good quality (“plums”), and some are not (“lemons”), but the buyer cannot tell the difference between the two qualities; of course the seller knows whether the car is a lemon or a plum. Suppose that consumers are willing to pay $4,000 for a lemon and $6,400 for a plum; and sellers are willing to sell a lemon for $3,500 and a plum for $5,600. a. If there is a 40% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case. b. If there is a 10% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case?

A thousand used cars are for sale in Boston. Some of the cars are of good quality (“plums”), and some are not (“lemons”), but the buyer cannot tell the difference between the two qualities; of course the seller knows whether the car is a lemon or a plum. Suppose that consumers are willing to pay $4,000 for a lemon and $6,400 for a plum; and sellers are willing to sell a lemon for $3,500 and a plum for $5,600. a. If there is a 40% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case. b. If there is a 10% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case?

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter16: Information, Risk, And Insurance

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20CTQ: A website offers a place for people to buy and sell emeralds, but information about emeralds can be...

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