A recently discovered painting by Picasso is on auction at Sotheby's. There are two main bidders Amy and Ben {1,2}. Bidding starts at £10M but the value of the painting is certainly not more than £20M. Each bidder's valuation v; is independently and uni- formly distributed on the interval [10M, 20M], and this is common knowledge among the players: A bidder knows their own valuation but not of their opponent. Consider an auction where an object is allocated to the highest bidder but the price paid by the bidder is determined randomly. With probability 3/4, the bidder pays their own bid, and with probability 1/4 the bidder pays the losing bid. The person bidding lowest pays nothing. If the bids are equal, each bidder gets the object with probability one-half, and in this case, pays their bid. Suppose that bidder 1 assumes that bidder 2 will bid a constant fraction, y, of bidder 2's valuation (and similarly, bidder 2 assumes bidder 1 will bid the same constant propor- tional value y of their valuation).
A recently discovered painting by Picasso is on auction at Sotheby's. There are two main bidders Amy and Ben {1,2}. Bidding starts at £10M but the value of the painting is certainly not more than £20M. Each bidder's valuation v; is independently and uni- formly distributed on the interval [10M, 20M], and this is common knowledge among the players: A bidder knows their own valuation but not of their opponent. Consider an auction where an object is allocated to the highest bidder but the price paid by the bidder is determined randomly. With probability 3/4, the bidder pays their own bid, and with probability 1/4 the bidder pays the losing bid. The person bidding lowest pays nothing. If the bids are equal, each bidder gets the object with probability one-half, and in this case, pays their bid. Suppose that bidder 1 assumes that bidder 2 will bid a constant fraction, y, of bidder 2's valuation (and similarly, bidder 2 assumes bidder 1 will bid the same constant propor- tional value y of their valuation).
Advanced Engineering Mathematics
10th Edition
ISBN:9780470458365
Author:Erwin Kreyszig
Publisher:Erwin Kreyszig
Chapter2: Second-order Linear Odes
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1RQ
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![4 A recently discovered painting by Picasso is on auction at Sotheby's. There are two
main bidders Amy and Ben {1,2}. Bidding starts at £10M but the value of the painting
is certainly not more than £20M. Each bidder's valuation v; is independently and uni-
formly distributed on the interval [10M, 20M], and this is common knowledge among
the players: A bidder knows their own valuation but not of their opponent. Consider an
auction where an object is allocated to the highest bidder but the price paid by the bidder
is determined randomly. With probability 3/4, the bidder pays their own bid, and with
probability 1/4 the bidder pays the losing bid. The person bidding lowest pays nothing. If
the bids are equal, each bidder gets the object with probability one-half, and in this case,
pays their bid.
Suppose that bidder 1 assumes that bidder 2 will bid a constant fraction, y, of bidder 2's
valuation (and similarly, bidder 2 assumes bidder 1 will bid the same constant propor-
tional value y of their valuation).
(i) Write down the expected payoff to bidder 1, as a function of their own valuation v1
and bid b1. (Ignore ties, where both bidders bid the same amount.)
(ii) Solve for bidder l's optimal bid, as a function of their valuation and hence solve
for y and thereby, find the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game, where each bidder
bids a constant fraction y of their own valuation.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F9e6ad0ae-bb00-43f0-ae45-c4083285dcca%2Fcddc453c-12f3-4983-ba91-ed3e5ae11d8f%2Fsymj0j_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:4 A recently discovered painting by Picasso is on auction at Sotheby's. There are two
main bidders Amy and Ben {1,2}. Bidding starts at £10M but the value of the painting
is certainly not more than £20M. Each bidder's valuation v; is independently and uni-
formly distributed on the interval [10M, 20M], and this is common knowledge among
the players: A bidder knows their own valuation but not of their opponent. Consider an
auction where an object is allocated to the highest bidder but the price paid by the bidder
is determined randomly. With probability 3/4, the bidder pays their own bid, and with
probability 1/4 the bidder pays the losing bid. The person bidding lowest pays nothing. If
the bids are equal, each bidder gets the object with probability one-half, and in this case,
pays their bid.
Suppose that bidder 1 assumes that bidder 2 will bid a constant fraction, y, of bidder 2's
valuation (and similarly, bidder 2 assumes bidder 1 will bid the same constant propor-
tional value y of their valuation).
(i) Write down the expected payoff to bidder 1, as a function of their own valuation v1
and bid b1. (Ignore ties, where both bidders bid the same amount.)
(ii) Solve for bidder l's optimal bid, as a function of their valuation and hence solve
for y and thereby, find the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game, where each bidder
bids a constant fraction y of their own valuation.
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