A publishing house sells two books, Mopey Dick (a book about a private detective from the backwoods of Vermont) and Moby Dick (the Melville classic). Moby Dick has three times the demand of Mopey Dick. In other words, at each and every price level, three times as many copies of Moby Dick would be sold. For both books, assume that average costs of production are constant and equal. Would it be inconsistent with profit maximization for the publisher to charge the same price for these two books that are differentially successful?

A publishing house sells two books, Mopey Dick (a book about a private detective from the backwoods of Vermont) and Moby Dick (the Melville classic). Moby Dick has three times the demand of Mopey Dick. In other words, at each and every price level, three times as many copies of Moby Dick would be sold. For both books, assume that average costs of production are constant and equal. Would it be inconsistent with profit maximization for the publisher to charge the same price for these two books that are differentially successful?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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