A professor of economics gives multiple choice exams each semester. He curves the exams by giving the maximum possible points to the highest non-zero score on the exam.1 For example, if a 50 question exam is worth 100 points and the top score in the class is 40, then each question is worth 100/40 = 2.5 points if answered correctly and 0 otherwise. Grades are then awarded as follows: 65% or better = "excellent", 48% or better = "good", 34% or better = "satisfactory", and below 34% = "fail". A. Suppose that all students know the correct answer to the first question in the exam - because the professor ALWAYS takes it from the previous year's exam paper - but have no idea what the other questions will be. Could the students form a cartel (sustainable or not) to ensure that each student received an "excellent" for the exam? B. Would a student who was concerned with relative class standing have an incentive to cheat? C. Is it likely that such a cartel would be successful in a large class?

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A professor of economics gives multiple choice exams each semester. He curves the exams by giving the maximum possible points to the highest non-zero score on the exam.1 For example, if a 50 question exam is worth 100 points and the top score in the class is 40, then each question is worth 100/40 = 2.5 points if answered correctly and 0 otherwise. Grades are then awarded as follows: 65% or better = "excellent", 48% or better = "good", 34% or better = "satisfactory", and below 34% = "fail".
A. Suppose that all students know the correct answer to the first question in the exam - because the professor ALWAYS takes it from the previous year's exam paper - but have no idea what the other questions will be. Could the students form a cartel (sustainable or not) to ensure that each student received an "excellent" for the exam?
B. Would a student who was concerned with relative class standing have an incentive to cheat? C. Is it likely that such a cartel would be successful in a large class?

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