(a) Argue that the strategy profile in which each buyer bids according to the function B defined by B(v) = v/2 is not a Nash equilib- rium. Hint: Find a profitable deviation for some v € [0, 1]. (b) Suppose the seller uses a posted price p. What is her expected revenue? Which price maximizes her expected revenue? Hint: What is the probability of at least one buyer is willing to pay p? (c) Recall that in the first price auction, the seller's expected revenue is (n-1)/(n+1). Compare the seller's revenue from the first-price auction and that from posted-price selling.
(a) Argue that the strategy profile in which each buyer bids according to the function B defined by B(v) = v/2 is not a Nash equilib- rium. Hint: Find a profitable deviation for some v € [0, 1]. (b) Suppose the seller uses a posted price p. What is her expected revenue? Which price maximizes her expected revenue? Hint: What is the probability of at least one buyer is willing to pay p? (c) Recall that in the first price auction, the seller's expected revenue is (n-1)/(n+1). Compare the seller's revenue from the first-price auction and that from posted-price selling.
Chapter17: Capital And Time
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 17.6P
Related questions
Question
2
![1. "
valuations. Bidder i's valuation, Vi, is drawn from the uniform distri-
bution on [0, 1], for i = 1,2, ..., n. In other words, the cdf of Vi, can
be defined as F(v) = v for v E [0, 1] (and, of course, F(v) = 0 for v < 0
and F(v) = 1 for v > 1). Each bidder's valuation is independent of any
other bidder's valuation. Consider the first-price auction. As I have ar-
gued in class, the strategy profile in which B;(v) = B(v) = (n– 1)/n·V
for all v e [0, 1] and i = 1, 2, ...,n is a Nash equilibrium. For this ex-
ercise, consider the case n = 3.
Consider the auction model with a continuum of possible
(a) Argue that the strategy profile in which each buyer bids according
to the function B defined by B(v) = v/2 is not a Nash equilib-
rium. Hint: Find a profitable deviation for some v E [0, 1].
(b) Suppose the seller uses a posted price p. What is her expected
revenue? Which price maximizes her expected revenue? Hint:
What is the probability of at least one buyer is willing to pay p?
(c) Recall that in the first price auction, the seller's expected revenue
is (n-1)/(n+1). Compare the seller's revenue from the first-price
auction and that from posted-price selling.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fdcc7de61-6c81-441e-9f88-fdabfdeed285%2F12857afd-5ca5-4344-8aaf-a95265a98745%2Fdzy8go_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:1. "
valuations. Bidder i's valuation, Vi, is drawn from the uniform distri-
bution on [0, 1], for i = 1,2, ..., n. In other words, the cdf of Vi, can
be defined as F(v) = v for v E [0, 1] (and, of course, F(v) = 0 for v < 0
and F(v) = 1 for v > 1). Each bidder's valuation is independent of any
other bidder's valuation. Consider the first-price auction. As I have ar-
gued in class, the strategy profile in which B;(v) = B(v) = (n– 1)/n·V
for all v e [0, 1] and i = 1, 2, ...,n is a Nash equilibrium. For this ex-
ercise, consider the case n = 3.
Consider the auction model with a continuum of possible
(a) Argue that the strategy profile in which each buyer bids according
to the function B defined by B(v) = v/2 is not a Nash equilib-
rium. Hint: Find a profitable deviation for some v E [0, 1].
(b) Suppose the seller uses a posted price p. What is her expected
revenue? Which price maximizes her expected revenue? Hint:
What is the probability of at least one buyer is willing to pay p?
(c) Recall that in the first price auction, the seller's expected revenue
is (n-1)/(n+1). Compare the seller's revenue from the first-price
auction and that from posted-price selling.
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