8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q,where q; is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market5demand is q(p) =-1p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and themarket is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market isА. 5В. 4С.3D. 2

Total revenue determines the amount earned from the quantity produced.Economic costs involve not…

8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q, where qi is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market demand is q(p) = - p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and the market is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market is A. 5 C. 3 D. 2 B. 4

8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q, where qi is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market demand is q(p) = - p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and the market is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market is A. 5 C. 3 D. 2 B. 4

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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3. Demand for a good produced by a duopoly is given by P = 100 - Q. Both firms have constant marginal costs, MC = 20 and zero fixed costs. Firms can choose to maximize profit or revenue. Suppose firm 1 choose to maximise profit and firm 2 choose to maximise revenue. Determine the equilibrium price and quantity of each firm.
I need help with econ multiple hw questions asap! 93) As the number of firms change in an oligopoly market, what will it become? A. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a monopoly market equilibrium B. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a competitive market equilibrium C. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a socially optimal equilibrium. D. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a cartel equilibrium. 92) Refer to the attached Table 40. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, what will SuperDuper Saver's growth-related profits be? A. $25 B. $250 C. $85 D. $50
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