8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q,where q; is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market5demand is q(p) =-1p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and themarket is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market isА. 5В. 4С.3D. 2

Total revenue determines the amount earned from the quantity produced.Economic costs involve not…

8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q, where qi is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market demand is q(p) = - p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and the market is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market is A. 5 C. 3 D. 2 B. 4

8. There are several identical firms in a market. The cost function of firm i is q? +q, where qi is the output of this firm, and q is the sum of other firms' output. The market demand is q(p) = - p. We assume that all firms are Cournot oligopolists, and the market is free entry. In equilibrium the number of firms in the market is A. 5 C. 3 D. 2 B. 4

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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3. Demand for a good produced by a duopoly is given by P = 100 - Q. Both firms have constant marginal costs, MC = 20 and zero fixed costs. Firms can choose to maximize profit or revenue. Suppose firm 1 choose to maximise profit and firm 2 choose to maximise revenue. Determine the equilibrium price and quantity of each firm.
I need help with econ multiple hw questions asap! 93) As the number of firms change in an oligopoly market, what will it become? A. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a monopoly market equilibrium B. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a competitive market equilibrium C. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a socially optimal equilibrium. D. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a cartel equilibrium. 92) Refer to the attached Table 40. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, what will SuperDuper Saver's growth-related profits be? A. $25 B. $250 C. $85 D. $50
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A5
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Coke and Pepsi dominate the cola market. Suppose that the marginal cost of making cola is $2. Assume also that the demand for cola is given by the following table: Price $8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Quantity 5 cans 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Suppose Coke and Pepsi both supply cola. They form a cartel and agree to cooperate on how much soda to produce. In this cartel case, how many bottles of cola would be sold? Type your answer...
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6. Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $10 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of q1 = 100– 2p1+p2, where q1 is Firm l's output, pi is Firm l's price, and p2 is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is q2 = 100– 2p2+P1. Solve for the NE.
8. Suppose there are two identical firms in an industry who compete by setting quantities. The output of firm 1 is denoted by q1 and that of firm 2 is denoted by 92. Each firm faces a constant marginal cost of 3. Let Q denote total output, 1.e. Qq1 +42. The inverse demand curve in the market is given by P-15-Q (a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity produced by each firm and the market price. (b) If the firms could collude, what would be the total output in the mar- ket? Assuming each firm produces half of the collusive output, what is the profit of each firm?
21. In the industry, only two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) operate and they produce a homogenous good. They collude: they maximize their joint profit and split it equally between them. Firm I has the total cost of producing q; units of output given by the function TC(q)-8q1. The total cost of producing q: units of output for Firm 2 is TC(q)-q. Only integer quantities are allowed (no fractions). The market demand for the good is Q(P)-72-P, where Q is the quantity demanded and P is the unit price of the good. How many units of the good do cach firm produce in the equilibrium? A. Each firm produces 14 units. B. Firm I produces 32 units, and Firm 2 produces 2 units. C. Firm 1 produces 28 units, and Firm 2 produces 4 units. D. Each firm produces 16 units. E. None of the above
5.
1. Consider a Cournot duopoly with the inverse demand P = 260 - 2Q. Two firms compete choosing their quantities. Both firms have constant. marginal and average cost MC = AC = 20. a. Find each firm's best response function. b. Find the Cournot equilibrium. c. Plot the best response curves and illustrate the equilibrium point.