8. The labor union and management of a particular company have been negotiating a new labor contract. However, negotiations have now come to an impasse, with management making a "final" offer of a wage increase of $1.10 per hour and the union making a "final" demand of a $1.60 per hour increase. Therefore, both sides have agreed to let an impartial arbitrator set the wage increase somewhere between $1.10 and $1.60 per hour (inclusively). The arbitrator has asked each side to submit to her a confidential proposal for a fair and economically reasonable wage increase (rounded to the nearest dime). From past experience, both sides know that this arbitrator normally accepts the proposal of the side that gives the most from its final figure. If neither side changes its final figure, or if they both give in the same amount, then the arbitrator normally compromises halfway between ($1.35 in this case). Each side now needs to determine what wage increase to propose for its own maximum advantage. Formulate this problem as a two-person, zero-sum game by constructing a payoff table for the labor union.

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8. The labor union and management of a particular company have been negotiating a new labor contract.
However, negotiations have now come to an impasse, with management making a “final" offer of a wage
increase of $1.10 per hour and the union making a “final” demand of a $1.60 per hour increase. Therefore,
both sides have agreed to let an impartial arbitrator set the wage increase somewhere between $1.10 and
$1.60 per hour (inclusively).
The arbitrator has asked each side to submit to her a confidential proposal for a fair and economically
reasonable wage increase (rounded to the nearest dime). From past experience, both sides know that this
arbitrator normally accepts the proposal of the side that gives the most from its final figure. If neither side
changes its final figure, or if they both give in the same amount, then the arbitrator normally compromises
halfway between ($1.35 in this case). Each side now needs to determine what wage increase to propose for its
own maximum advantage.
Formulate this problem as a two-person, zero-sum game by constructing a payoff table for the labor union.
Transcribed Image Text:8. The labor union and management of a particular company have been negotiating a new labor contract. However, negotiations have now come to an impasse, with management making a “final" offer of a wage increase of $1.10 per hour and the union making a “final” demand of a $1.60 per hour increase. Therefore, both sides have agreed to let an impartial arbitrator set the wage increase somewhere between $1.10 and $1.60 per hour (inclusively). The arbitrator has asked each side to submit to her a confidential proposal for a fair and economically reasonable wage increase (rounded to the nearest dime). From past experience, both sides know that this arbitrator normally accepts the proposal of the side that gives the most from its final figure. If neither side changes its final figure, or if they both give in the same amount, then the arbitrator normally compromises halfway between ($1.35 in this case). Each side now needs to determine what wage increase to propose for its own maximum advantage. Formulate this problem as a two-person, zero-sum game by constructing a payoff table for the labor union.
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To formulate this problem as a two-person, zero-sum game, we can construct a payoff table for the labor union. In this game, the union and management are the two players, and the union's payoffs represent its profits or losses depending on the arbitrator's decision.

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