66) Refer to Figure b. Kate and Alice are sisters with a very strict mother. The girls are not allowed to watch television during the day when their mother is at work. The mother comes home one day and knows at least one girl was watching the television because it is warm. She sends the girls to their separate bedrooms while she decides what to do. After giving it some thought, she decides to send a message to the naughty girls and offers them the following deal: if they both deny watching TV, they will each be grounded for 3 weeks; if one squeals on the other, but the other denies watching TV, the squealer is grounded for 2 weeks, while the denier is grounded for 10; if they both squeal, each is grounded for 6 weeks. The following payoff matrix illustrates the girls' dilemma, with Kate's payoff shown in the upper left-hand corner of each cell and Alice's in the lower right-hand corner. What is Alice's dominant strategy? Kate Deny Squeal -2 Deny Figure b Alice -10 -10 -6 Squeal A) Squeal B) Deny C) Alice does not have a dominant strategy. D) Alice's dominant strategy depends upon what Kate does.
66) Refer to Figure b. Kate and Alice are sisters with a very strict mother. The girls are not allowed to watch television during the day when their mother is at work. The mother comes home one day and knows at least one girl was watching the television because it is warm. She sends the girls to their separate bedrooms while she decides what to do. After giving it some thought, she decides to send a message to the naughty girls and offers them the following deal: if they both deny watching TV, they will each be grounded for 3 weeks; if one squeals on the other, but the other denies watching TV, the squealer is grounded for 2 weeks, while the denier is grounded for 10; if they both squeal, each is grounded for 6 weeks. The following payoff matrix illustrates the girls' dilemma, with Kate's payoff shown in the upper left-hand corner of each cell and Alice's in the lower right-hand corner. What is Alice's dominant strategy? Kate Deny Squeal -2 Deny Figure b Alice -10 -10 -6 Squeal A) Squeal B) Deny C) Alice does not have a dominant strategy. D) Alice's dominant strategy depends upon what Kate does.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
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66) Refer to Figure b. Kate and Alice are
sisters with a very strict mother. The girls
are not allowed to watch television during
the day when their mother is at work. The
mother comes home one day and knows at
least one girl was watching the television
because it is warm. She sends the girls to
their separate bedrooms while she decides
what to do. After giving it some thought,
she decides to send a message to the
naughty girls and offers them the
following deal: if they both deny watching
TV, they will each be grounded for 3
weeks; if one squeals on the other, but the
other denies watching TV, the squealer is
grounded for 2 weeks, while the denier is
grounded for 10; if they both squeal, each
is grounded for 6 weeks. The following
payoff matrix illustrates the girls' dilemma,
with Kate's payoff shown in the upper
left-hand corner of each cell and Alice's in
the lower right-hand corner. What is
Alice's dominant strategy?
Kate
Deny -3
Squeal -2
Deny
Figure b
Alice
-10
-10
-6
Squeal
A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) Alice does not have a dominant
-6
strategy.
D) Alice's dominant strategy depends
upon what Kate does.
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