6. There are 2 players who have to decide how to split one dollar. The bargaining process works as follows. Players simultaneously announce the share they would like to receive $₁ and $2, with 0 ≤ $1,82 ≤ 1. If 8₁ +82 ≤ 1, then the players receive the shares they named and if 8₁ +8₂ > 1, then both players fail to achieve an agreement and receive zero. Which of the following strategy profiles is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? a) (0.3, 0.7); b) (0.5, 0.5); c) (1.0, 1.0); d) All of the above

6. There are 2 players who have to decide how to split one dollar. The bargaining process works as follows. Players simultaneously announce the share they would like to receive $₁ and $2, with 0 ≤ $1,82 ≤ 1. If 8₁ +82 ≤ 1, then the players receive the shares they named and if 8₁ +8₂ > 1, then both players fail to achieve an agreement and receive zero. Which of the following strategy profiles is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? a) (0.3, 0.7); b) (0.5, 0.5); c) (1.0, 1.0); d) All of the above

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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