6. There are 2 players who have to decide how to split one dollar. The bargaining process works as follows. Players simultaneously announce the share they would like to receive $₁ and $2, with 0 ≤ $1,82 ≤ 1. If 8₁ +82 ≤ 1, then the players receive the shares they named and if 8₁ +8₂ > 1, then both players fail to achieve an agreement and receive zero. Which of the following strategy profiles is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? a) (0.3, 0.7); b) (0.5, 0.5); c) (1.0, 1.0); d) All of the above

6. There are 2 players who have to decide how to split one dollar. The bargaining process works as follows. Players simultaneously announce the share they would like to receive $₁ and $2, with 0 ≤ $1,82 ≤ 1. If 8₁ +82 ≤ 1, then the players receive the shares they named and if 8₁ +8₂ > 1, then both players fail to achieve an agreement and receive zero. Which of the following strategy profiles is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? a) (0.3, 0.7); b) (0.5, 0.5); c) (1.0, 1.0); d) All of the above

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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2. Consider the two-by-two bimatrix game listed below: Left Right (2,-2) (1,-1) Up Down (3,-3) (-1,1) where the player "Row" chooses the action "up" or "down" and the player "Column" chooses the action "left" or "right". Describe a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium for this game.
PLAYER B LEFT RIGHT UP 5 FOR A, 30 FOR B 10 FOR A, 12 FOR B PLAYER A DOWN -2 FOR A, 10 FOR B 8 FOR A, 15 FOR B In the above game, the players are seeking to maximize the number they recieve. They choose at the same time. What is the Nash equillibrium? Player A will choose UP and player B will choose LEFT Player A will UP and player B will choose RIGHT Player A will choose DOWN and player B will choose LEFT Player A will choose DOWN and player B will choose RIGHT Player A will choose LEFT and player B will choose UP Player A will choose LEFT and player B will choose DOWN Player A will choose RIGHT and player B will choose UP Player A will choose RIGHT and player B will choose DOWN
Two hunters are on a stag hunt. They split up in the forest and each have two strategies: hunt for a stag (S), or give up the stag hunt and instead hunt for rabbit (R). If they both hunt for a stag, they will succeed and each earn a payoff of 9. If one hunts for stag and the other gives up and hunts for rabbit, the stag hunter receives 0 and the rabbit hunter 8. If both hunt for rabbit then each receives 7. Compute all Nash equilibria for this game, called 'The Stag Hunt', depicted below. Which of these equilibria do you think is most likely to be played? Why? S R S 9,9 8,0 R 0,8 7,7
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Q5 A and B are sharing a room with a TV and a DVD player. DVD's can be rented for the weekend for a cost of $5. They would each get $4 worth of enjoyment from a weekend movie, so if both of them rent a movie a on a particular weekend they can each get $8 worth of enjoyment at a cost of $5 rental. (a) Model this as a strategic form game with both players having the strategies Rent (R) and No Rent (N), (b) What is the equilibrium if they share the room for one weekend only? (e) Draw the extensive form of the game if they stay together for two weeks, and identify the subgame perfect equilibria. (d) Explain whether or not the outcome of the game will change if they stay together for 10 weeks.
Consider the following game. You will roll a fair, 6-sided die either once or twice. You decide whether to do the second roll after you see how the first one lands. The payoff is $n, where n is the outcome of the last roll. For example, if the first roll lands 4 and the second lands 2, you win $2. If you only do one roll and it lands 4, you win $4. Suppose you make your decision about whether to go for a second roll based on expected monetary value. Then you will go for a second roll if (and only if) the first roll lands x or lower. What is x?
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Carlos and Deborah are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Carlos chooses Right and Deborah chooses Right, Carlos will receive a payoff of 5 and Deborah will receive a payoff of 1. Carlos Deborah Left Left 4,4 Right 2,4 Right 6,7 5,1 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Carlos chooses and Deborah chooses
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The following five individuals have different utility functions over food (good x) and clothing (good y): 1) u₁(x, y) = 3x²y 2) u₂(x, y) = 2√x + y 3) Uz(x, y) = x0.6y0.4 4) u₁(x, y) = x² + y² 1 5) us(x, y) = x + 3y For each of these people: a) Compute their marginal utilities of good x, MUx = Ju(x,y) MU, = ду du(x,y) ax b) Check whether the property of "more is better" is satisfied for both goods? Explain. [Hint: Check whether marginal utilities are positive assuming positive amounts of good x and good y] ƏMUX əx and marginal utility of good y, c) Does the marginal utility of good x diminish, remain constant, or increase as each of the individuals buys more x? Explain. [Hint: There are 2 ways to do it: 1) visually check what happens to the expression of MUx when x increases (does it decrease, keep constant or decrease?); or 2) take the partial derivative of this marginal utility with respect to x, that is ƏMUx .aMUX ƏMUX If 0, the marginal utility of x is increasing in x] d) Does the…
The options for the last 3 fill-in-the-blanks are "Up" or "Down." Thank you!
Part 1 Sam and Ray do not like each other and will be miserable if they attend the same event. Both are going out Friday night to either the bar or a concert; and Sam will publicly tweet where he is going before Ray makes his plans. Each will get 6 payoff from going to a concert and 2 benefit from going to the bar if the other is not there. If both go to the same venue, they will get a payoff of zero. Write a game tree for this game and find the equilibrium strategy and equilibrium payoffs clearly labeling both. Part 2 Take the game from the question above and switch the order of the decisions. Write a game tree for this game and find the equilibrium strategy and equilibrium payoffs clearly labeling both. Has the equilibrium strategies and payoffs changed from the question above? Explain why.