5. Stackelberg ,Firm1 : leader, Firm2: follower T₁ = y; (P(Y)-c), Y= y₁+y₂, P(Y) = a - Y (1) optimal firm 1's y? (2) now both firm1 and firm2 are followers, firm1 does not know the type of firm2 firm2's high cost probability 0 low cost probability 1- 0 then, firm2 knows own type, firm1 only knows that probability. then what is the optimal firm1's output?
5. Stackelberg ,Firm1 : leader, Firm2: follower T₁ = y; (P(Y)-c), Y= y₁+y₂, P(Y) = a - Y (1) optimal firm 1's y? (2) now both firm1 and firm2 are followers, firm1 does not know the type of firm2 firm2's high cost probability 0 low cost probability 1- 0 then, firm2 knows own type, firm1 only knows that probability. then what is the optimal firm1's output?
A First Course in Probability (10th Edition)
10th Edition
ISBN:9780134753119
Author:Sheldon Ross
Publisher:Sheldon Ross
Chapter1: Combinatorial Analysis
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1.1P: a. How many different 7-place license plates are possible if the first 2 places are for letters and...
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