5. Consider the following model of a competitive labour market where both firms and workers have perfect foresight and symmetric information about the price level (that is, no misperceptions). Firms' technology is given by the production function y=aN½/2 (production function) where a is a positive constant representing total productivity, N is employment and the elasticity of production to employed labour is 1/2. The government requires firms to pay pension contributions to the fiscal authority: the contribution is a small fraction x of the wage paid to each employed worker. Therefore, firms profits equal Py-WN-xWN and they are maximized taking the price level P, the nominal wage W, and the pension contribution rate x as given. Labour supply is given by: W = PbN where b is a positive constant. Answer all the following questions. a) Derive the labour demand schedule by solving the profit maximization problem of firms. b) What are the consequences of pension contributions for potential employment, output and real wages? Compare the cases with and without contributions and justify your answers.

Linear Algebra: A Modern Introduction
4th Edition
ISBN:9781285463247
Author:David Poole
Publisher:David Poole
Chapter2: Systems Of Linear Equations
Section2.4: Applications
Problem 23EQ: 23. Consider a simple economy with just two industries: farming and manufacturing. Farming consumes...
icon
Related questions
Question
5. Consider the following model of a competitive labour market where both firms
and workers have perfect foresight and symmetric information about the price
level (that is, no misperceptions). Firms' technology is given by the production
function
y=aN ¹/2
(production function)
where a is a positive constant representing total productivity, N is employment
and the elasticity of production to employed labour is 1/2.
The government requires firms to pay pension contributions to the fiscal authority:
the contribution is a small fraction x of the wage paid to each employed worker.
Therefore, firms profits equal
Py-WN-x WN
and they are maximized taking the price level P, the nominal wage W, and the
pension contribution rate x as given. Labour supply is given by:
W = PbN
where b is a positive constant. Answer all the following questions.
a) Derive the labour demand schedule by solving the profit maximization
problem of firms.
b) What are the consequences of pension contributions for potential
employment, output and real wages? Compare the cases with and without
contributions and justify your answers.
Transcribed Image Text:5. Consider the following model of a competitive labour market where both firms and workers have perfect foresight and symmetric information about the price level (that is, no misperceptions). Firms' technology is given by the production function y=aN ¹/2 (production function) where a is a positive constant representing total productivity, N is employment and the elasticity of production to employed labour is 1/2. The government requires firms to pay pension contributions to the fiscal authority: the contribution is a small fraction x of the wage paid to each employed worker. Therefore, firms profits equal Py-WN-x WN and they are maximized taking the price level P, the nominal wage W, and the pension contribution rate x as given. Labour supply is given by: W = PbN where b is a positive constant. Answer all the following questions. a) Derive the labour demand schedule by solving the profit maximization problem of firms. b) What are the consequences of pension contributions for potential employment, output and real wages? Compare the cases with and without contributions and justify your answers.
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 3 steps with 3 images

Blurred answer
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Linear Algebra: A Modern Introduction
Linear Algebra: A Modern Introduction
Algebra
ISBN:
9781285463247
Author:
David Poole
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Algebra & Trigonometry with Analytic Geometry
Algebra & Trigonometry with Analytic Geometry
Algebra
ISBN:
9781133382119
Author:
Swokowski
Publisher:
Cengage