4. Asymmetric information and labor markets Arjun is the manager of a factory. Workers at the factory are assigned to one of two tasks, one of which requires skilled labor and one of which requires unskilled labor. Because skilled workers earn a higher wage than unskilled workers, everyone who applies for a job says they're skilled. Arjun's challenge is to figure out who is actually a skilled worker and who is an unskilled worker. Suppose that Arjun would like to use the economic concept of signaling to separate out worker types. Which of the following scenarios illustrates this concept? Skilled workers enroll in an online certification course to demonstrate their ability. Skilled workers pay to take a certification course to demonstrate their ability. Arjun voluntarily pays all workers a higher wage in hopes of attracting and retaining more productive workers. Arjun implements a test to determine whether applicants are skilled or not. Suppose, instead, Arjun considers paying efficiency wages to increase the factory's profitability. True or False: Efficiency wages are set below the average industry wage and are intended to give the firm implementing them a competitive advantage over rivals. True False