Questions 4 and 5 answers.. 4. Assume that the PF for wine is: Qwine= T0.5* log(Lwine) and for laptops is: Qiaptoplog(K) * log(Llaptop) where K is capital. What is the opportunity cost of producing onemore unit of wine?log(K)*Lwineа)то.5.LlaptopT0.5 *Llaptop_b)log(K)*LwineT0.5+log(Llaptop).c)log(K)+Lwineто5-Llaptopd)log(K)*log(Lwine)5. Use the production function as given in question 4 for laptops. Assume that K is 10,Liaptop is 100 and price per laptop is $1000. What is the wage?a) $0.5b) $2c) $10d) $20

Question4: opportunity cost: dQwinedLwinedQlaptopdLLaptp = T0.5Lwinelog(K)Llaptop = T0.5*…

4. Assume that the PF for wine is: Qwine = T0.5 * log(Lwine) and for laptops is: Qiaptop log(K) * log(Llaptop) where K is capital. What is the opportunity cost of producing one more unit of wine? log(K)*Lwine a) T0.5»Llaptop T0.5 „Llaptop_ b) log(K)•Lwine T0.5,log(Llaptop) c) log(K)•Lwine T0.5»Llaptop d) log(K)•log(Lwine) 5. Use the production function as given in question 4 for laptops. Assume that K is 10, Liaptop is 100 and price per laptop is $1000. What is the wage? a) $0.5

4. Assume that the PF for wine is: Qwine = T0.5 * log(Lwine) and for laptops is: Qiaptop log(K) * log(Llaptop) where K is capital. What is the opportunity cost of producing one more unit of wine? log(K)*Lwine a) T0.5»Llaptop T0.5 „Llaptop_ b) log(K)•Lwine T0.5,log(Llaptop) c) log(K)•Lwine T0.5»Llaptop d) log(K)•log(Lwine) 5. Use the production function as given in question 4 for laptops. Assume that K is 10, Liaptop is 100 and price per laptop is $1000. What is the wage? a) $0.5

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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[Cheap Talk] Two players must decide whether to implement a project, which has gross value v E {0, 100, 200} to each player. Both players think each value is equally likely. Player 1 (the sender) learns the true value of the project. Then, he reports a value {high,medium,low} to player 2 (the decider), and player 2 decides whether or not to implement the project. If the project is not implemented, both players get zero. If a project with value v is implemented, payoffs are P1 : v – 75 P2 : – 125 (a) Show that there is no Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which player 1 always reveals the true value to player 2. (b) Find a PBE in which player 1 reports "high" if the project is worth $200, "low" if the project is worth $0 (and either “low" or "high" when the project is worth $100, figure out which one works). (c) Find another PBE (or, if you believe there are no others, explain).