3. Two players play the following normal form game. 1\2 Left Middle Right Left 4,2 3,3 1,2 Middle 3,3 5,5 2,6 2,1 6,2 Right 3,3 Suppose that there is a probability p that the game continues next period and a probability (1-p) that it ends. What is the threshold p* such that when p≥ p* (Middle, Middle) is sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium by grim trigger strategies, but when p < p playing Middle in all periods is not a best response? [Here the grim strategy is: play Middle if the play in all previous periods was (Middle, Middle); play Right otherwise.] a) 1/2; Ob) 1/3; Oc) 1/4; Od) 2/5.
3. Two players play the following normal form game. 1\2 Left Middle Right Left 4,2 3,3 1,2 Middle 3,3 5,5 2,6 2,1 6,2 Right 3,3 Suppose that there is a probability p that the game continues next period and a probability (1-p) that it ends. What is the threshold p* such that when p≥ p* (Middle, Middle) is sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium by grim trigger strategies, but when p < p playing Middle in all periods is not a best response? [Here the grim strategy is: play Middle if the play in all previous periods was (Middle, Middle); play Right otherwise.] a) 1/2; Ob) 1/3; Oc) 1/4; Od) 2/5.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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![3. Two players play the following normal form game.
1\2
Left
Middle
Right
Left
4,2
3,3
1,2
Middle
3,3
5,5
2,6
2,1
6,2
Right
3,3
Suppose that there is a probability p that the game continues next period and a probability (1-p) that it ends. What is the threshold p* such that
when p > p* (Middle, Middle) is sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium by grim trigger strategies, but when p < p playing Middle in all
periods is not a best response? [Here the grim strategy is: play Middle if the play in all previous periods was (Middle, Middle); play Right otherwise.]
a) 1/2;
b) 1/3;
Oc) 1/4;
Od) 2/5.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F95ff3d8d-fe29-424a-b43b-f792814f53c4%2F91d90b00-4253-4d43-bc15-232023d42fa0%2F4slpbv_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:3. Two players play the following normal form game.
1\2
Left
Middle
Right
Left
4,2
3,3
1,2
Middle
3,3
5,5
2,6
2,1
6,2
Right
3,3
Suppose that there is a probability p that the game continues next period and a probability (1-p) that it ends. What is the threshold p* such that
when p > p* (Middle, Middle) is sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium by grim trigger strategies, but when p < p playing Middle in all
periods is not a best response? [Here the grim strategy is: play Middle if the play in all previous periods was (Middle, Middle); play Right otherwise.]
a) 1/2;
b) 1/3;
Oc) 1/4;
Od) 2/5.
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