3. Consider a variant of the Rubinstein bargaining game with two players where player 1's discount factors is d1 and player 2's discount factor is 82: a) In cach round player 1 makes a proposal and player 2 says “yes" (game over) or “no" (continues to the next round). Find SPE-play and the SPE. b) In round 1 player 1 makes a proposal and players 2 says "yes" (game over) or says "no" (continues to the next round). From round 2 onwards, in each round, player 2 makes a proposal and player 1 is the responder ("yes" = game ends, "no" = continues to the next round). Determine SPE-play and the SPE. %3D %3D

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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3. Consider a variant of the Rubinstein bargaining game with two players where player l's discount factors is di
and player 2's discount factor is &2:
a) In each round player 1 makes a proposal and player 2 says "yes" (game over) or "no" (continues to the next
round). Find SPE-play and the SPE.
b) In round 1 player 1 makes a proposal and players 2 says “yes" (game over) or says “no" (continues to the
next round). From round 2 onwards, in each round, player 2 makes a proposal and player 1 is the responder
(“yes" = game ends, “no" = continues to the next round). Determine SPE-play and the SPE.
%3D
Transcribed Image Text:3. Consider a variant of the Rubinstein bargaining game with two players where player l's discount factors is di and player 2's discount factor is &2: a) In each round player 1 makes a proposal and player 2 says "yes" (game over) or "no" (continues to the next round). Find SPE-play and the SPE. b) In round 1 player 1 makes a proposal and players 2 says “yes" (game over) or says “no" (continues to the next round). From round 2 onwards, in each round, player 2 makes a proposal and player 1 is the responder (“yes" = game ends, “no" = continues to the next round). Determine SPE-play and the SPE. %3D
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