3) Joint Ownership and Contracts A firm is jointly owned by Juan and Roda. The firm's production function requires two input: effort by Juan, denoted by x and effort by Roda denoted by y. Effort is only observable by the person who exerts it. The cost to Juan of a unit of his effort is c; = 2 and the cost a unit of her effort is c, = 2. The price received for the goods is p = 2. The production of the firm is given by Q = 10[ln(x +1) + In(y+1)]. Assume that both Juan and Roda are risk neutral rational agents. Roda of a) What are the socially optimal amount of effort r* and y*? What is the total surplus in that case? (Hint: Solve the problem of a social planner that cares equally for Juan and Roda) b) Suppose that Juan and Roda have a contract that specifies that Juan pays a fixed amount w=15 to Roda and that Juan gets to keep and sell all the output. What is the total surplus now? How much of that surplus goes to Juan? To Roda?

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3) Joint Ownership and Contracts
A firm is jointly owned by Juan and Roda. The firm's production function requires two input:
effort by Juan, denoted by x and effort by Roda denoted by y. Effort is only observable by the
person who exerts it. The cost to Juan of a unit of his effort is c; = 2 and the cost to Roda of
a unit of her effort is c,
firm is given by Q = 10[ln(x +1)+ In(y+1)]. Assume that both Juan and Roda are risk neutral
rational agents.
2. The price received for the goods is p = 2. The production of the
|3D
a) What are the socially optimal amount of effort x* and y*? What is the total surplus in that
case? (Hint: Solve the problem of a social planner that cares equally for Juan and Roda)
b) Suppose that Juan and Roda have a contract that specifies that Juan pays a fixed amount
w=15 to Roda and that Juan gets to keep and sell all the output. What is the total surplus
now? How much of that surplus goes to Juan? To Roda?
c) Now suppose that the contract between Juan and Roda specifies that the total output is
split evenly between them. What are the levels of effort x and y that Juan and Roda will
chose in that case? Does this contract lead to the socially efficient outcome?
d) Can you propose another contract where the total production is the same as in the socially
optimal case? Briefly explain what this contract should look like or briefly explain why such
a contract is impossible.
Transcribed Image Text:3) Joint Ownership and Contracts A firm is jointly owned by Juan and Roda. The firm's production function requires two input: effort by Juan, denoted by x and effort by Roda denoted by y. Effort is only observable by the person who exerts it. The cost to Juan of a unit of his effort is c; = 2 and the cost to Roda of a unit of her effort is c, firm is given by Q = 10[ln(x +1)+ In(y+1)]. Assume that both Juan and Roda are risk neutral rational agents. 2. The price received for the goods is p = 2. The production of the |3D a) What are the socially optimal amount of effort x* and y*? What is the total surplus in that case? (Hint: Solve the problem of a social planner that cares equally for Juan and Roda) b) Suppose that Juan and Roda have a contract that specifies that Juan pays a fixed amount w=15 to Roda and that Juan gets to keep and sell all the output. What is the total surplus now? How much of that surplus goes to Juan? To Roda? c) Now suppose that the contract between Juan and Roda specifies that the total output is split evenly between them. What are the levels of effort x and y that Juan and Roda will chose in that case? Does this contract lead to the socially efficient outcome? d) Can you propose another contract where the total production is the same as in the socially optimal case? Briefly explain what this contract should look like or briefly explain why such a contract is impossible.
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