[20] Consider a market with two firms, A and B. Firm A's marginal cost is: MC, = 100 + ¼q»• while firm B's marginal cost is: MC, = 80 + 2qp. Striking up a cartel agreement, these firms collectively decide to produce 200 units (i.e., 200 = q, + qµ). Wishing to maximize their joint (cartel) profit, quotas should be set such that A produces less than B. A. True В. False [21] Continuing question (20), if firm A sticks to its quota level of output, firm B will wish to produce А. more than its quota level of output. less than its quota level of output. its quota level of output. all of the above are possible. В. C. D.

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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need help on questions 20-24

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Consider a market with two firms, A and B. Firm A's marginal cost is: MC,= 100+¼q,, while firm
[20]
B's marginal cost is: MC, = 80 + 2qp. Striking up a cartel agreement, these firms collectively decide to
produce 200 units (i.e., 200 = qa + qB). Wishing to maximize their joint (cartel) profit, quotas should be set
such that A produces less than B.
A.
True
В.
False
[21]
Continuing question (20), if firm A sticks to its quota level of output, firm B will wish to produce
А.
more than its quota level of output.
less than its quota level of output.
its quota level of output.
all of the above are possible.
В.
С.
D.
Consider US Steel (i.e., a producer of steel) and Pom Wonderful (i.e., a producer of pomegranate
[22]
juice). Since these two firms produce very different products, it's reasonable to assume they do not compete
against each other, and thus operate in different markets. Accordingly, if you were to construct a price
reaction curve for US Steel based on the Bertrand Model of price competition, with the price of US Steel's
product (Ps) on the vertical axis and the price of Pom Wonderful’s product (Pp) on the horizontal axis, you
would expect this reaction curve to have a:
А.
positive slope.
negative slope
a slope equal to zero.
В.
С.
Suppose a particular market consists of three firms, A, B, and C. Assume these firms compete
[23]
according to the Cournot model of quantity competition. Also, each firm's marginal cost equals zero.
Accordingly, if the market demand equation is: Q = 500 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the
market price, then the equation of firm A's reaction function is (Note: q, denotes A's quantity produced, qB
denotes B's quantity produced, and qc denotes C's quantity produced.):
А.
IA = 500
49B +
В.
500 - 49B
49c
С.
250 - 2qB
24 c
D.
= 250 - qB
[24]
demand: Q= 600 - P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the market price. Suppose each firm has a total
cost given as: TC=100q, where q is the amount produced by the firm. Accordingly, the greater the number
of firms in the market, the market price will converge to (i.e., get closer to):
Imagine a market has several firms, each behaving as Cournot competitors, with the following market
А.
100
В.
200
С.
500
D.
Infinity
Transcribed Image Text:Page < 4 > of 6 + ZOOM Consider a market with two firms, A and B. Firm A's marginal cost is: MC,= 100+¼q,, while firm [20] B's marginal cost is: MC, = 80 + 2qp. Striking up a cartel agreement, these firms collectively decide to produce 200 units (i.e., 200 = qa + qB). Wishing to maximize their joint (cartel) profit, quotas should be set such that A produces less than B. A. True В. False [21] Continuing question (20), if firm A sticks to its quota level of output, firm B will wish to produce А. more than its quota level of output. less than its quota level of output. its quota level of output. all of the above are possible. В. С. D. Consider US Steel (i.e., a producer of steel) and Pom Wonderful (i.e., a producer of pomegranate [22] juice). Since these two firms produce very different products, it's reasonable to assume they do not compete against each other, and thus operate in different markets. Accordingly, if you were to construct a price reaction curve for US Steel based on the Bertrand Model of price competition, with the price of US Steel's product (Ps) on the vertical axis and the price of Pom Wonderful’s product (Pp) on the horizontal axis, you would expect this reaction curve to have a: А. positive slope. negative slope a slope equal to zero. В. С. Suppose a particular market consists of three firms, A, B, and C. Assume these firms compete [23] according to the Cournot model of quantity competition. Also, each firm's marginal cost equals zero. Accordingly, if the market demand equation is: Q = 500 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the market price, then the equation of firm A's reaction function is (Note: q, denotes A's quantity produced, qB denotes B's quantity produced, and qc denotes C's quantity produced.): А. IA = 500 49B + В. 500 - 49B 49c С. 250 - 2qB 24 c D. = 250 - qB [24] demand: Q= 600 - P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the market price. Suppose each firm has a total cost given as: TC=100q, where q is the amount produced by the firm. Accordingly, the greater the number of firms in the market, the market price will converge to (i.e., get closer to): Imagine a market has several firms, each behaving as Cournot competitors, with the following market А. 100 В. 200 С. 500 D. Infinity
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