2.1{a|=₁ ajzk} (a) ai where 1 is an indicator function, such that if total contributions exceed k units, then this term = 1, otherwise it is zero. a; is the level of contribution, where a¡ € {0,1}. u; (a) = Find the two Nash equilibria in this game and explain why these can be referred to as a Nash Equilibrium.

2.1{a|=₁ ajzk} (a) ai where 1 is an indicator function, such that if total contributions exceed k units, then this term = 1, otherwise it is zero. a; is the level of contribution, where a¡ € {0,1}. u; (a) = Find the two Nash equilibria in this game and explain why these can be referred to as a Nash Equilibrium.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Answer 1:4 is incorrect
This question is related to equilibrium and its drive? all detail is given in a snap.
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this is not graded paper, I have made these practice questions myself. Dont reject it.
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